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RESEARCH PRODUCT
Participation Costs for Responders Can Reduce Rejection Rates in Ultimatum Bargaining
Patrick W. SchmitzPatrick W. SchmitzDaniel SchunkDaniel SchunkPhilipp C. Wichardtsubject
MicroeconomicsUltimatum gameStochastic gameEconomicsCognitive dissonanceUltimatum bargainingRejection ratehealth care economics and organizationsSunk costsdescription
This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which responders first had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation was costly, but the participation cost was smaller than the minimum payoff that a responder could guarantee himself in the ultimatum game. Compared to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of unfavorable offers is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible explanation based on cognitive dissonance is offered.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008-01-01 | SSRN Electronic Journal |