6533b831fe1ef96bd129840a

RESEARCH PRODUCT

Hume on the Phenomenological Discovery of the Self

Marίa Elósegui

subject

PsychoanalysisDenialArgumentMind–body problemIdentity (philosophy)media_common.quotation_subjectSelfPersonal identitySubject (philosophy)PassionsPsychologymedia_commonEpistemology

description

This paper presents a synthesis of my research into the problem of the self in Hume. The copious bibliography available on this topic indicates that the subject I suggest to discuss is problematic but also of crucial interest. I propose to develop the following argument, namely, that there exists in Hume a psychological awareness of the self. There is no incompatibility between the denial of personal identity in A Treatise of Human Nature Book I, and the arguments put forward in Book II Of the Passions, and in Book III, Of the Understanding of Morals. I shall maintain that Hume is not elaborating an ontological but a psychological theory of the self. This represents a new departure with regard to the philosophy of his time. On the other hand, I consider Hume’s critique on the self as a substance as pertinent if one takes substance in the Cartesian sense of the word. However, his critique or his denial of an abstract identity of the seif does not mean that he denies the possibility of our knowing ourselves. For Hume it is possible for us to know who we are. I would express this in a rather paradoxical Statement: “Every man needs to know what he is in order to be so”.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1677-0_25