6533b831fe1ef96bd1299b90
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Using Power as a Negative Cue: How Conspiracy Mentality Affects Epistemic Trust in Sources of Historical Knowledge.
Olivier KleinRoland ImhoffPia Lambertysubject
AdultMalePsychologie sociale expérimentalePersuasionSocial Psychologymedia_common.quotation_subjectPersuasive Communication050109 social psychologyTrustingroup bias050105 experimental psychologycredibilityPower (social and political)Young AdultCredibilityHumansconspiracy mentality0501 psychology and cognitive sciencesIn-group favoritismmedia_commonSocial IdentificationSource credibility05 social sciencesIngroups and outgroupsGroup ProcessesEpistemologyKnowledgeAttitudeEliteFemaleAttitude changeepistemic trusthistoryCuesPower PsychologicalPsychologySocial psychologydescription
Classical theories of attitude change point to the positive effect of source expertise on perceived source credibility persuasion, but there is an ongoing societal debate on the increase in anti-elitist sentiments and conspiracy theories regarding the allegedly untrustworthy power elite. In one correlational ( N = 275) and three experimental studies ( N = 195, N = 464, N = 225), we tested the novel idea that people who endorse a conspiratorial mind-set (conspiracy mentality) indeed exhibit markedly different reactions to cues of epistemic authoritativeness than those who do not: Whereas the perceived credibility of powerful sources decreased with the recipients' conspiracy mentality, that of powerless sources increased independent of and incremental to other biases, such as the need to see the ingroup in particularly positive light. The discussion raises the question whether a certain extent of source-based bias is necessary for the social fabric of a highly complex society.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018-05-02 |