6533b835fe1ef96bd129ea0e
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Constrained consensus for bargaining in dynamic coalitional TU games
Angelia NedicDario Bausosubject
Computer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryMathematical optimizationBargaining problemSequential gameRobustness (computer science)Computer scienceComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTINGCombinatorial game theoryGraph theoryTransferable utilityMathematical economicsGame theorydescription
We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. We assume that the players in the game interact only with their neighbors, where the neighbors may vary over time. The main contributions of the paper are the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability 1 of the bargaining protocol to a random allocation that lies in the core of the robust game under some mild conditions on the players' communication graphs.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011-12-01 | IEEE Conference on Decision and Control and European Control Conference |