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RESEARCH PRODUCT
MAC Design for WiFi Infrastructure Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Ilenia TinnirelloGiovanni NegliaLaura Giarresubject
FOS: Computer and information sciencesgame theorycheating nodeaccess protocolsmobile nodesComputer sciencegame-theoretic approachMAC designDistributed coordination functionUpload[INFO.INFO-NI]Computer Science [cs]/Networking and Internet Architecture [cs.NI]MAC protocolschannel access policyComputer Science - Computer Science and Game TheoryFOS: MathematicsElectrical and Electronic EngineeringMathematics - Optimization and Controlwireless LANdistributed coordination functionMechanism designcheating nodesWiFi infrastructure networksbusiness.industryApplied MathematicsNode (networking)WiFiComputerSystemsOrganization_COMPUTER-COMMUNICATIONNETWORKSWiFi; cheating nodes; game theory; MAC protocolsComputer Science ApplicationsShared resourceprogrammable cardsOptimization and Control (math.OC)game-theoretic analysisBest responserandom access schemebusinessrandom access protocolRandom accessCommunication channelComputer networkComputer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)description
In WiFi networks, mobile nodes compete for accessing a shared channel by means of a random access protocol called Distributed Coordination Function (DCF). Although this protocol is in principle fair, since all the stations have the same probability to transmit on the channel, it has been shown that unfair behaviors may emerge in actual networking scenarios because of non-standard configurations of the nodes. Due to the proliferation of open source drivers and programmable cards, enabling an easy customization of the channel access policies, we propose a game-theoretic analysis of random access schemes. Assuming that each node is rational and implements a best response strategy, we show that efficient equilibria conditions can be reached when stations are interested in both uploading and downloading traffic. More interesting, these equilibria are reached when all the stations play the same strategy, thus guaranteeing a fair resource sharing. When stations are interested in upload traffic only, we also propose a mechanism design, based on an artificial dropping of layer-2 acknowledgments, to force desired equilibria. Finally, we propose and evaluate some simple DCF extensions for practically implementing our theoretical findings.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011-08-01 |