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RESEARCH PRODUCT
Do we need algebraic-like computations? A reply to Bonatti, Pena, Nespor, and Mehler (2006).
Michael D. TylerRonald PeeremanPierre Perruchetsubject
GeneralizationComputationmedia_common.quotation_subjectExperimental and Cognitive PsychologyIgnorance[ SCCO.PSYC ] Cognitive science/Psychology050105 experimental psychology03 medical and health sciences0302 clinical medicineDevelopmental Neurosciencemedicine0501 psychology and cognitive sciencesAlgebraic numberGeneral PsychologyComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUSConfusionmedia_commonComplement (set theory)Cognitive science05 social sciences[SCCO.PSYC]Cognitive science/Psychology[SCCO.PSYC] Cognitive science/Psychologymedicine.symptomPsychologyMathematical economics030217 neurology & neurosurgerydescription
L. L. Bonatti, M. Pena, M. Nespor, and J. Mehler (2006) argued that P. Perruchet, M. D. Tyler, N. Galland, and R. Peereman (2004) confused the notions of segmentation and generalization by ignoring the evidence for generalization in M. Pena, L. L. Bonatti, M. Nespor, and J. Mehler (2002). In this reply, the authors reformulate and complement their initial arguments, showing that their way of dealing with segmentation and generalization is not due to confusion or ignorance but rather to the fact that the tests used in Pena et al. make it likely that neither segmentation nor generalization were captured in their experiments. Finally, the authors address the challenge posed by Pena et al. of accounting for the whole pattern of their results without invoking rule-based, algebraic-like computations.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006-05-01 |