6533b853fe1ef96bd12acae3

RESEARCH PRODUCT

Explaining Contagion: Tactical, Ideological, or Geographical Impulses?

Alexandru Filip

subject

TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUSPoliticsNoticeOrder (exchange)Political sciencePolitical economymedia_common.quotation_subjectIsolation (psychology)MainstreamPosition (finance)ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTINGIdeologymedia_common

description

Elections are a zero-sum game, and the gain of one party equals the loss of another party. Likewise, the vote gains of some groups of parties have parallel losses among other party groups or party families. Political Parties do not operate in isolation. When Eurosceptic parties are successful, pro-European parties tend to lose votes as a consequence. Would a political party decide to adjust its position every time a Eurosceptic Party gains votes? The assumption here is that if a political party gains votes from one election to another (or at least does not lose votes), the information that the election result is communicating to it is that it is doing something right. A party might take notice of the fact that populists are growing across the board (stealing voters from other parties present on the political scene) but decide according to the ‘if it’s working, don’t fix it’ logic that it should not adjust its own position, because voters are telling it that its own position or choice of issues to ‘push’ is fine. According to the same logic, it would be important, in order for the past election model and radical party hypothesis to hold, that a political party will react, or will react more virulently, when it loses votes itself at the same time as a Eurosceptic challenger is gaining them. This chapter explores precisely that dynamic and investigates how parties adapt to fringe party improvement when they or their mainstream rivals are losing votes in various constellations.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69036-6_6