6533b854fe1ef96bd12af3df

RESEARCH PRODUCT

Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games

Tibor NeugebauerRachel CrosonEnrique Fatas

subject

jel:C92Economics and EconometricsMatching (statistics)jel:C72jel:D44Contrast (statistics)jel:H41Strong reciprocityExperimental economicsPublic goodExperimental economics public goods voluntary contribution mechanism weakest link mechanism reciprocitySocial preferencesMicroeconomicsReciprocity (social psychology)EconomicsEmpirical evidenceFinance

description

Previous experimental and empirical evidence has identified social preferences in the voluntary provision of public goods. A number of competing models of such preferences have been proposed. We provide evidence for one model of behavior in these games, reciprocity (or matching, or conditional cooperation). Consistent with previous research, we find that participants in the voluntary contribution mechanism attempt to match the contributions of others in their group. We also examine participants in a related game with different equilibria, the weakest-link mechanism. Here, in contrast, participants contribute so as to match the minimum contribution of others in their group.

yearjournalcountryeditionlanguage
2005-04-01Economics Letters
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007