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RESEARCH PRODUCT
Crítica a la naturalización del deontologismo en la teoría del proceso dual del juicio moral de Joshua Greene
Javier Graciasubject
joshua greenedeontologismoPhilosophy05 social sciencesneuroéticaB1-5802Dual process theory (moral psychology)050105 experimental psychologyFocus (linguistics)Epistemology03 medical and health sciencesPhilosophy0302 clinical medicineCharacter (mathematics)Èticajuicio moral0501 psychology and cognitive sciencesPhilosophy (General)030217 neurology & neurosurgeryNaturalismdescription
In this paper I propose to question the Joshua Greene’s neuroethical thesis about the essentially emotional character of so-called “deontological moral judgments”. Frist, I focus on the dual process theory of moral judgment and I criticize that they are considered only and mainly intuitive and non reflective. Se condly, I question that the “utilitarian judgment” is linked to mathematical calculation and the deontological judgment is exclusively reduced to non-reflective factor of emotion. The main objection to Greene’s naturalism raised by me is trying to eliminate the philosophical justification about the moral validity defended by Kant’s deontologism; meanwhile Greene reduces “deontological moral judgment” to exclusively psychological and neurophysiological factors associated with emotion.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018-01-01 | Isegoría |