6533b857fe1ef96bd12b43ae
RESEARCH PRODUCT
WITHIN-TEAM COMPETITION IN THE MINIMUM EFFORT COORDINATION GAME
Javier PeroteJavier PeroteTibor NeugebauerEnrique FatasEnrique Fatassubject
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUSCompetition (economics)MicroeconomicsEconomics and EconometricsNon-cooperative gameEconomicsCoordination gameBaseline (configuration management)Industrial organizationdescription
. We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort coordination game. The introduction of within-team competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no competition and increases coordination relative to a secure treatment where the pay-off-dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within-team competition does not prevent subjects from polarizing both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006-06-01 | Pacific Economic Review |