Search results for "TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS"
showing 10 items of 63 documents
N-string vertices in string field theory.
1993
We give the general form of the vertex corresponding to the interaction of an arbitrary number of strings. The technique employed relies on the ``comma" representation of String Field Theory where string fields and interactions are represented as matrices and operations between them such as multiplication and trace. The general formulation presented here shows that the interaction vertex of N strings, for any arbitrary N, is given as a function of particular combinations of matrices corresponding to the change of representation between the full string and the half string degrees of freedom.
A methodology to select the price criterion in public procurement
2015
[EN] The construction sector is a key driver for economic growth in any nation and public procurement is one of its pillars hence the importance of the study and investigation of its mechanisms, especially tendering criteria. Price is the main deciding factor for most tenders and projects must have an appropriate base price relative to market price to avoid problems during the execution of the project. Most research on price criteria has been developed from the point of view of bidders and has discussed the development of tools and methodologies for determining the optimal bid price. In this paper we propose a methodology for public procurement procedures from the point of view of the admin…
BUDGET REVENUES IN EU-27
2012
In this paper we make a brief and comprehensive analysis of budget revenues for al the countries of E.U.27. Our main goal was to study the main trends in budget revenues for the countries of European Union. This analysis is also important to emphasis the effects of economic crisis to budget revenues.
MOESM4 of Do small protected habitat patches within boreal production forests provide value for biodiversity conservation? A systematic review protoc…
2019
Additional file 4. The performance of the search string. Document of testing search string in search engines.
Intra-Party Heterogeneity in Policy Preferences and Its Effect on Issue Salience: Evidence from the Comparative Candidates Survey
2016
Quantitative research on the positions of political parties and party competition regularly invokes the assumption that parties are unitary actors with homogenous policy preferences. Drawing on Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) data from 28 elections in 21 developed democracies, we show that candidates often hold quite heterogeneous issue positions and that the extent of this heterogeneity varies significantly across parties and, most interestingly, even within parties across different issue dimensions. In an effort to explore the implications of such intra-party heterogeneity for party strategy and competition, we argue that intra-party heterogeneity and issue salience go together, becau…
WITHIN-TEAM COMPETITION IN THE MINIMUM EFFORT COORDINATION GAME
2006
. We report the results of an experiment on a continuous version of the minimum effort coordination game. The introduction of within-team competition significantly increases effort levels relative to a baseline with no competition and increases coordination relative to a secure treatment where the pay-off-dominant equilibrium strategy weakly dominates all other actions. Nonetheless, within-team competition does not prevent subjects from polarizing both in the efficient and the inefficient equilibria.
Convex semi-infinite games
1986
This paper introduces a generalization of semi-infinite games. The pure strategies for player I involve choosing one function from an infinite family of convex functions, while the set of mixed strategies for player II is a closed convex setC inRn. The minimax theorem applies under a condition which limits the directions of recession ofC. Player II always has optimal strategies. These are shown to exist for player I also if a certain infinite system verifies the property of Farkas-Minkowski. The paper also studies certain conditions that guarantee the finiteness of the value of the game and the existence of optimal pure strategies for player I.
Consensus in Noncooperative Dynamic Games: a Multi-Retailer Inventory Application
2008
We focus on Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal Nash equilibria for a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game with a special structure of the stage cost. We study the existence of these solutions by proving that the game is a potential game. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize the aforementioned solutions and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multistage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately, not necessarily Pareto op…
Identification of efficient equilibria in multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and non-monotonicity
2018
Abstract This paper focuses on multiproduct trading with indivisibilities and where a representative agent may have non-monotonic preferences. In this framework, the set of firms’ profits (which comes from efficient subgame perfect Nash equilibria) is the Pareto frontier of some projection of the core of the game. We show that under monotonicity efficient subgame perfect Nash equilibria are achieved by single offers and the equilibrium characterization is easy to obtain. When dealing with non-monotonic preferences the problem becomes more challenging. Then, we define a pair of primal–dual linear programming problems that fully identifies the core of the game. A set of modified versions of t…
A mixed 0-1 linear programming approach to the computation of all pure-strategy nash equilibria of a finite n -person game in normal form
2014
Published version of an article in the journal: Mathematical Problems in Engineering. Also available from the publisher at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/640960 A main concern in applications of game theory is how to effectively select a Nash equilibrium, especially a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for a finite n -person game in normal form. This selection process often requires the computation of all Nash equilibria. It is well known that determining whether a finite game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is an NP-hard problem and it is difficult to solve by naive enumeration algorithms. By exploiting the properties of pure strategy and multilinear terms in the payoff functions, this p…