6533b857fe1ef96bd12b507a

RESEARCH PRODUCT

A Decision Model for the Multiple Criteria Group Secretary Problem: Theoretical Considerations

Pekka SalminenJeffrey E. TeichJyrki Wallenius

subject

MarketingOperations researchComputer scienceStrategy and ManagementStructure (category theory)Management Science and Operations ResearchConflict analysisManagement Information SystemsQuasiconvex functionBellman equationConflict resolutionMultiple criteriaProduction (economics)Mathematical economicsValue (mathematics)Preference (economics)Decision modelSecretary problem

description

A decision model is developed for solving the discrete multiple criteria group secretary problem. The model extends the single decision-maker progressive algorithm by Korhonen, Moskowitz and Wallenius to group contexts. As the original progressive algorithm, it relaxes the usual assumption of a fixed set of available decision alternatives and complete knowledge of a decision-maker's preference structure (value function). The decision-makers are requested to settle on a compromise, if possible. The model then proceeds with determining the likelihood of finding possibly/surely better settlements (compromises). Linear value functions, linear prospect theory-type value functions, and quasiconcave value functions are considered.

https://doi.org/10.1057/jors.1996.131