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RESEARCH PRODUCT
A Challenge to Boghossian's Incompatibilist Argument
Josep E. Corbísubject
Philosophymedia_common.quotation_subjectDoctrineInferenceExternalismIncompatibilismEpistemologyPhilosophyConeixement Teoria delA priori and a posterioriIndividuationmedia_commonIntuitiondescription
The paradox arises as we realize that (3) is clearly not knowable a priori, but (1) and (2) are. (2) holds 'a priori' because, according to Boghossian, it "just is the view that I have called the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge" (p. 202). The core of the paper is devoted, though, to argue that an externalist (i.e., someone who holds the view that "... facts external to a thinker's skin are relevant to the individuation of (certain of) his mental contents" (p. 199). is bound to concede that (1) is knowable 'a priori'. It would follow that, contrary to intuition, (3) can be known a priori since is the conclusion of an inference that relies on two premises that are, in
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1998-01-01 |