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RESEARCH PRODUCT

Taking Aim and Hitting the Target. Some Remarks on the Aristotelian Notion of eustoichia

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L’articolo è dedicato alla nozione aristotelica di eustochia (la capacità di fare buone congetture), nella convinzione che essa possa contribuire al ripensamento della nostra costitutiva precarietà. Diversamente da una lettura tradizionale che vede Aristotele principalmente come il filosofo del ragionamento deduttivo, l’articolo sostiene invece l’importanza di questa capacità cognitiva nel pensiero aristotelico. Con questo scopo, vengono analizzati i tre principali contesti in cui Aristotele fa riferimento all’eustochia: la costruzione del sillogismo (APo, 89b 10), il raggiungimento della virtù (EN, 1106b 16) e la creazione di metafore ((Rh. 1412a 13). Nonostante le evidenti differenze, queste tre situazioni condividono la componente di incertezza, rispetto alla quale l’eustochia rappresenta una preziosa risorsa. Le caratteristiche principali di questa abilità cognitiva sono la fallibilità e la velocità, due caratteristiche che la rendono particolarmente flessibile ed adatta a far fronte alle situazioni di incertezza e precarietà. This paper will focus on the Aristotelian concept of eustochia (shrewdness or good ability to conjecture). Composed by the adverb eu (well) and the verb stochazesthai (to conjecture, to guess), the word eustochia refers to the capacity to successfully guess. More in general, it can indicate the ability to achieve the target we are aiming at. The main characteristic of this skill is its fallibility. Indeed, we have no guarantee that the process of stochazein (guessing) will be successful. In modern terminology, we can say that eustochia is a reasonable but not algorithmic procedure for problem solving in uncertain conditions. The paper pursues a twofold objective. Firstly, we will show that eustochia plays a crucial role in Aristotelian philosophy (contrary to the traditional image of Aristotle as the philosopher of deductive reasoning). Indeed, Aristotle especially refers to eustochia in three different but important situations: 1. the construction of syllogisms (A Po, 89b 10); 2. the achievement of virtue (EN, 1106b 16); 3. the creation of metaphors (Rhet. 1412a 13). In the Aristotelian perspective, each of these activities plays a crucial role and they all need eustochia. It is noteworthy that this kind of ability is typical to the rhetorician (see also (Rh. 1395b 10 sgg.), as the reference to metaphors clearly shows. Indeed, the domain of rhetoric is inherently undeterminate, although not irrational. This is the domain of fallibility and uncertainty where eustochia is a necessary skill. Therefore, Aristotelian Rhetoric can give us useful suggestions in order to better understand eustochia and, more in general, knowledge under uncertainty. Secondly, we intend to show that eustochia is a difficult but essential human ability. It is both a result of a natural talent and experience. The intrinsic uncertainty of this typical rhetorical activity is not a fault but an important resource in order to face the precariousness of human life. Cette contribution porte sur la notion aristotélicienne d’eustochia (qui désigne la connaissance intuitive ; le fait de viser juste) et s’intéresse successivement à la construction des syllogismes, à la réalisation de la vertu et au façonnage des métaphores. Trois situations qui sont traversées par l’incertitude et le flou. L’analyse permet dès lors d’apprécier ce qui caractérise l’eustochia en propre, à savoir, la faillibilité, d’une part, la vitesse, de l ’autre.