6533b85ffe1ef96bd12c1265
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Les followers ont-ils vraiment de l'importance dans le modèle de Stackelberg?
Olivier MusyAurélien SaïdiLudovic A. Juliensubject
Marginal costEconomics and Econometricsfollower's output indexíndice de producto del seguidorJEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure Firm Strategy and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Marketsmodèle généralisé de Stackelberggeneralized Stackelberg competitioncompetencia de Stackelberg generalizadaCompetitive equilibriumrazón de descuento del markup del líderSupply and demandlcsh:Economic history and conditionsOligopolyjel:L20JEL : L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure Firm Strategy and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Marketseconomía linealgeneralized Stackelberg competition.Stackelberg competitionEconomicsLeader’s markup discount factor linear economy follower’s output discount factor myopic behavior[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and financesfacteurs d'escompte markupJEL : L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives Organization and Behavior/L.L2.L20 - General[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceHB71-74lcsh:HB71-74Economic history and conditionsLinear modellcsh:Economics as a scienceConvergence (economics)HC10-1085leader's markup discount ratio[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceGeneral Business Management and AccountingJEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives Organization and Behavior/L.L2.L20 - GeneralEconomics as a sciencelinear economyjel:L13leader's markup discount ratio linear economy follower's output index generalized Stackelberg competitionlcsh:HC10-1085économie linéaireStatistics Probability and UncertaintyConstant (mathematics)Mathematical economicsFinanceSocial Sciences (miscellaneous)description
In this paper, we consider a T-stage linear model of Stackelberg oligopoly. First, we show geometrically and analytically that under the two conditions of linear market demand and identical constant marginal costs, the T-stage Stackelberg model reduces to a model where T oligopolies exploit residual demand sequentially. At any stage, leaders behave as if followers did not matter. Second, we study social welfare and convergence toward competitive equilibrium. Especially, we consider the velocity of convergence as the number of firms increases. The convergence is faster when reallocating firms from the most to the less populated cohort until equalizing the size of all cohorts.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2011-12-01 |