6533b860fe1ef96bd12c3a6e
RESEARCH PRODUCT
The London Stock Exchange: Strategic Corporate Governance Restructuring After Demutualization
Laura Padilla AnguloFaten Ben SlimaneDjaoudath Alidousubject
[QFIN.GN] Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/General Finance [q-fin.GN]Restructuringmedia_common.quotation_subjectPrincipal–agent problemAccountingIRG_AXE1London Stock ExchangeJEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and ServicesJEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and GovernanceCompetition (economics)Corporate Governance[ QFIN.GN ] Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/General Finance [q-fin.GN]Stock exchange0502 economics and businessEconomicsJEL : G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and ServicesJEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure Firm Strategy and Market PerformanceDemutualization050207 economicsBusiness and International Management[ SHS.GESTION ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administrationmedia_common[QFIN.GN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin]/General Finance [q-fin.GN]050208 financebusiness.industryCorporate governance05 social sciencesBusiness StrategyPaymentJEL : G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and GovernanceIncentiveJEL : L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure Firm Strategy and Market Performance[SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administrationStrategic management[SHS.GESTION] Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administrationbusinessdescription
International audience; This study uses the London Stock Exchange (LSE), forced to demutualize due to major changes in its business environment, notably due to increased competition and technological advances, as field experiment to study corporate governance restructuring to adapt to new market conditions. The LSE improved its financial situation after demutualization and is an example of successful corporate governance restructuring. The LSE significantly restructured the composition of its board of directors following demutualization. The number of exchange members on the LSE board decreased after demutualization while the number of independent directors increased, pointing to a more “monitoring board”, in support of an agency theory approach. Interestingly, the large majority of these independent directors had experiences in diverse business.The LSE significantly reorganized its management team to adapt to the new strategies triggered by demutualization and modified its compensation by increasing performance-related payments. Results suggest that demutualization brings efficiencies if accompanied by changes in the governing bodies and in the incentive structures of the exchanges. Most of our results could be relevant also, for example, for firms going public, for smaller firms that are expanding their activities and searching for outside investors and for companies facing major changes in their business environments.
year | journal | country | edition | language |
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2014-01-30 |