6533b860fe1ef96bd12c3aee
RESEARCH PRODUCT
On the Relevance of Agency Conflicts in SME Debt Maturity Structure
José López-graciaReyes Mestre-barberásubject
Financebusiness.industryStrategy and Managementmedia_common.quotation_subjectDebt-to-GDP ratioAgency costMonetary economicsExternal debtGeneral Business Management and AccountingManagement of Technology and InnovationDebtEconomicsFixed assetEndogeneityInternal debtDebt levels and flowsbusinessmedia_commondescription
Previous theoretical research asserts that an optimal policy of debt maturity structure mitigates the various agency conflicts that arise through debt contracts. We test this hypothesis on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), which are very sensitive to agency problems. Such problems mainly arise between owners and debt providers, due to SMEs recording high growth and having few fixed assets and informational asymmetry. We provide evidence on the relevant effect of underinvestment, asset substitution, and overinvestment problems on SME debt structure. Results appear to be robust to both the endogeneity problem of explanatory variables and the censored dependent variable.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015-07-01 | Journal of Small Business Management |