6533b871fe1ef96bd12d1986

RESEARCH PRODUCT

A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

Penélope HernándezJosep E. PerisJuan Vidal-puga

subject

game theoryInformation Systems and Managementcost allocationGeneral Computer Scienceminimum cost spanning treesubgame perfect equilibriumManagement Science and Operations ResearchUNESCO::CIENCIAS TECNOLÓGICASIndustrial and Manufacturing EngineeringCost allocationGame TheorySubgame perfect equilibriumModeling and SimulationMinimum cost spanning tree

description

This paper deals with the problem of finding a way to distribute the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree problem between the players. A rule that assigns a payoff to each player provides this distribution. An optimistic point of view is considered to devise a cooperative game. Following this optimistic approach, a sequential game provides this construction to define the action sets of the players. The main result states the existence of a unique cost allocation in subgame perfect equilibria. This cost allocation matches the one suggested by the folk rule. The authors thank the support of the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, the Spanish Agency of Research, co-funded with FEDER funds, under the projects ECO2016-77200-P, ECO2017-82241-R, ECO2017-87245-R, PID2021-128228NB-I00, Consellería d’Innovación, Universitats, Ciencia i Societat Digital, Generalitat Valenciana [grant number AICO/2021/257], and Xunta de Galicia (ED431B 2019/34).

10.1016/j.ejor.2022.09.015https://hdl.handle.net/10550/88343