6533b873fe1ef96bd12d5721
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Influence of board of directors on firm performance: Analysis of family and non-family firms
M GiorginoSergio PaternostroPatricia Bachillersubject
Economics and EconometricsFirm offerStrategy and ManagementInstitutional investorAudit committeecorporate governancePrincipal–agent problemAccountingCorporate financefamily firmsfinancial performanceSettore SECS-P/07 - Economia AziendaleAccountingBusiness and International ManagementStakeholder theorysocial performancebusiness.industryCorporate governancefamily firmboard; corporate governance; family firms; financial performance; social performanceSECS-P/07 - ECONOMIA AZIENDALECorporate social responsibilityBusinessboardFinanceperformancedescription
This article analyses how board structure can affect both financial and social performance, comparing family and non-family firms. Our theoretical framework is based on the integration of the agency theory, traditionally used in the analysis of the impact of the board on the firm's financial performance, with the stakeholder theory, which is more appropriate in the analysis of the social aspects of the firm. Three main aspects are addressed: the analysis of the firm's social performance; the integration of agency theory with stakeholder theory; and the study of the specific characteristics of family firms' boards. The research confirms that neither the agency theory nor the stakeholder theory is fully able to explain on its own, without the other, the link between board structure and firm performance. The article has both practical and theoretical implications for the firm's activities and increases our knowledge about the relationship between the board and firm performance.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2015-01-01 |