6533b873fe1ef96bd12d59af
RESEARCH PRODUCT
A Further Note on Endogenous Spillovers in a Non-tournament R&D Duopoly
Antonio Tesorieresubject
MicroeconomicsOrganizational Behavior and Human Resource ManagementEconomics and EconometricsSimple (abstract algebra)Management of Technology and InnovationStrategy and ManagementCollusionEconomicsTournamentEndogenous asymmetry Endogenous spillovers R&D collusionSettore SECS-P/06 - Economia ApplicataDuopolydescription
This note considers the paper of Poyago-Theotoky (1999) on strategic R&D with endogenous spillovers. It proves through an example that, under R&D collusion, optimality sometimes requires either minimal or asymmetric spillovers. It also provides a simple sufficient condition for optimal spillovers between colluding firms to involve maximal spillovers (i.e., complete sharing of information).
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2008-09-01 | Review of Industrial Organization |