Search results for "Duopoly"
showing 10 items of 26 documents
Pure Component Pricing in a Duopoly
2002
In this paper, we focus on price competition between several multiproduct firms which produce differentiated systems, each consisting of two complementary products. It is shown here that if firms are restricted to pure component pricing (bundling is not allowed) whenever components produced are compatible, pure strategy equilibrium may not exist. With the use of bundling strategies, pure strategy equilibrium always exists. For the pure component pricing case we provide a full characterization for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings
2014
Collusion is when firms coordinate on suppressing competition, and coordination typically requires that firms communicate in some manner. This study conducts experiments to determine what modes of communication are able to produce and sustain collusion and how the efficacy of communication depends on firm heterogeneity and the number of firms. We consider two different communication treatments: non-binding price announcements and unrestricted written communication. Our main findings are that price announcements allow subjects to coordinate on a high price but only under duopoly and when firms are symmetric. While price announcements do result in higher prices when subjects are asymmetric, t…
Networks of Manufacturers and Retailers
2005
We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer and a retailer. We find that only three distribution networks are stable for particular values of the degree of product differentiation and link costs: (i) the non-exclusive distribution and non-exclusive dealing network in which both retailers distribute both products is stable for intermediate degree of product differentiation and small link costs; (ii) the exclusive distribution and exclusive dealing network in which each retailer distributes a…
Experimental duopolies under price guarantees
2011
In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs ("aggressive" and "soft" price-beating and price-matching) are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy. Our results show that PGs may lead close to the collusive outcome, depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the "aggressive" price-beating type.
Multi-product firms and product variety
2008
The goal of this paper is to study the role of multi-product firms in the market provision of product variety. The analysis is conducted using the spokes model of non-localized competition proposed by Chen and Riordan (2007). Firstly, we show that multi-product firms are at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis single-product firms and can only emerge if economies of scope are sufficiently strong. Secondly, under duopoly product variety may be higher or lower with respect to both the first best and the monopolistically competitive equilibrium. However, within a relevant range of parameter values duopolists drastically restrict their product range in order to relax price competition, and as a…
To lead or to wait? An application to internationalization strategies under demand uncertainty
2019
We examine the exports versus foreign direct investment (FDI) decision under demand uncertainty for an asymmetric cost duopoly. One of the firms can lead entry before demand realization or retain flexibility enjoying an informational advantage. When the time value of information is small and for sufficiently low investment costs, follow‐the‐leader behavior in FDI arises. Relatively high investment (fixed) costs result in follow‐the‐leader exporting behavior. When the time value of information becomes significant, the potential leader will opt for a wait‐and‐see strategy. For intermediate values of investment costs, the efficient firm invests, while the rival chooses to export.
Pricing and infrastructure fees in shaping cooperation in a model of high-speed rail and airline competition
2020
Abstract This paper studies the effects of cooperation in a hub-and-spoke network with high-speed rail and airline competition. The distinctive elements of our analysis are the consideration of: (i) per-passenger airport and rail infrastructure fees; (ii) mixed bundling pricing by partners, and (iii) an airline duopoly in the international market. We show that partners fix the cheapest bundle price of the combined trip, that non-allied operators respond by decreasing the prices per link, and that connecting traffic increases. Per-passenger fees significantly affect the price differences following cooperation. An empirical application confirms that it is privately profitable and that welfare…
Generic Advertising, Brand Advertising and Price Competition: An Analysis of Free-Riding Effects and Coordination Mechanisms
2010
The main purpose of generic advertising is to enlarge the total market demand rather than capturing further slices from competitors. Several studies point out emergence of free-riding behavior under independent contribution and suggest use of coordination mechanism. However, existing literature does not shed light on the conditions under which generic advertising can be detrimental (beneficial) to stronger firms weakening (strengthening) their competitive advantage. Also, under a setting including both price and brand advertising competition, coordination in generic advertising has not been unraveled. In order to deal with such issues, we consider a one-stage duopoly game in which two firms…
Duopoly and Product Design
2014
Competition in product design is considered in the context of a circular duopoly model where each duopolist can choose either a standardized design or a customized version of its product. We examine the circumstances that lead to multiple equilibria, and characterize the type of equilibrium as a function of both the customization costs and the lower bound on the degree of customization. In the welfare analysis, it is shown that the degree of customization offered in equilibrium can be substantially different from the socially optimal level of this variable.
R&D WITH SPILLOVERS: MONOPOLY VERSUS NONCOOPERATIVE AND COOPERATIVE DUOPOLY
2010
This paper compares industry profit and R&D propensity for a duopoly conducting either noncooperative or cooperative R&D and a monopoly, using two different basic models of strategic R&D. One postulates spillovers in R&D inputs and predicts that equilibrium joint profit and R&D levels are always larger under monopoly. The other postulates spillovers in R&D outputs and sometimes predicts that joint profit and R&D levels are larger under either of the alternative scenarios. In addition, unlike input spillovers, spillovers in R&D outputs sometimes exert a positive effect on both effective and private noncooperative R&D levels.