6533b873fe1ef96bd12d4bc0
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Duopoly and Product Design
Lluís M. GraneroMiguel González-maestresubject
MicroeconomicsCompetition (economics)Variable (computer science)Product designmedia_common.quotation_subjectEconomicsTheoryofComputation_GENERALContext (language use)Product (category theory)Function (engineering)DuopolyPersonalizationmedia_commondescription
Competition in product design is considered in the context of a circular duopoly model where each duopolist can choose either a standardized design or a customized version of its product. We examine the circumstances that lead to multiple equilibria, and characterize the type of equilibrium as a function of both the customization costs and the lower bound on the degree of customization. In the welfare analysis, it is shown that the degree of customization offered in equilibrium can be substantially different from the socially optimal level of this variable.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2014-01-01 | SSRN Electronic Journal |