Search results for "Duopoly"
showing 6 items of 26 documents
La elección del momento oportuno de la política ambiental en un mercado duopolístico
2015
[EN] In this paper the strategic use of innovation by two polluting firms to influence environ-mental policy is evaluated. The analysis is carried out by comparing two alternative policy regimes for two policy instruments: Taxes and standards. The first of the regimes assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the policy instrument. In the second one, there is no commitment. The results show that when there is no commitment and a tax is used to control emissions, the strategic behavior of firms can be welfare improving if the efficiency of the clean technology is relatively low. If this is not the case, the strategic behavior of the duopolists has a detrimental effect on welf…
Union structure and incentives for innovation
2002
Abstract In this paper, we consider the effect of union structure on the adoption of innovation in the context of Cournot duopoly. With a market size large enough, we show that the incentive to innovate is higher under a decentralized union structure (with each firm facing its own independent union) than under an industry-wide union. However, for a small market size (or, equivalently, for sufficiently drastic potential innovation), the new technology is more likely to be adopted in the presence of a centralized union. This result goes against the conventional view that unionization harms the incentive to innovate.
MIXED OLIGOPOLY, PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND COMPETITION FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT SERVICES*
2006
This paper explores frequency and pricing decisions in a horizontally and vertically differentiated duopoly when there is competition between means of transport and where one of the firms need not necessarily maximize profits. The private and the mixed duopoly are compared and distortions from the social optimum are identified, both analytically and numerically. A mixed duopoly does not recover the socially optimal solution. However, the presence of a (public) non-profit maximizing operator is a useful measure to get closer to the social optimum. When both operators are (private) profit maximizers, some control measures such as price caps and minimum service availability would reduce the di…
A reconsideration of the link between vertical externality and managerial incentives
2018
Previous research revealed that the strategic role of delegation contracts disappears if two quantity†setting firms outsource input production to a monopolistic supplier. I show that this role is restored if the assumption of a downstream duopoly is relaxed. Thus, delegation contracts allow downstream profit†maximizing owners to commit their firms to a behavior that differs from their preferences. This behavior varies nonmonotonically with the number of firms in the downstream market. Corresponding deviations from profit maximization are larger if the upstream monopolist makes a price precommitment. But little to no deviation occurs if the number of firms is large.
Product Line Choice in Retail Duopoly
2011
This paper develops a successive duopoly model to identify conditions under which differentiated retailers that compete in quantities, when deciding on the range of brands to offer, will carry overlapping product lines. They will do so when retail margins on each brand are not too asymmetric. Otherwise, the less profitable brand is foreclosed from the market. It is shown that welfare increases if the upstream industry is perfectly competitive, even though fewer brands may be sold. With price competition though, exclusive dealing arises when retailers are not too differentiated and in-store competition is sufficiently intense.
Networks of manufacturers and retailers
2011
We study the endogenous formation of networks between manufacturers of differentiated goods and multi-product retailers who interact in a successive duopoly. Joint consent is needed to establish and/or maintain a costly link between a manufacturer and a retailer. We find that only three distribution networks are stable for particular values of the degree of product differentiation and link costs: (i) the non-exclusive distribution & non-exclusive dealing network in which both retailers distribute both products is stable for intermediate degree of product differentiation and small link costs; (ii) the exclusive distribution & exclusive dealing network in which each retailer distributes a dif…