Search results for " Ga"

Game Theoretic Decentralized Feedback Controls in Markov Jump Processes

2017

This paper studies a decentralized routing problem over a network, using the paradigm of mean-field games with large number of players. Building on a state-space extension technique, we turn the problem into an optimal control one for each single player. The main contribution is an explicit expression of the optimal decentralized control which guarantees the convergence both to local and to global equilibrium points. Furthermore, we study the stability of the system also in the presence of a delay which we model using an hysteresis operator. As a result of the hysteresis, we prove existence of multiple equilibrium points and analyze convergence conditions. The stability of the system is ill…

Decomposition and Mean-Field Approach to Mixed Integer Optimal Compensation Problems

2016

Mixed integer optimal compensation deals with optimization problems with integer- and real-valued control variables to compensate disturbances in dynamic systems. The mixed integer nature of controls could lead to intractability in problems of large dimensions. To address this challenge, we introduce a decomposition method which turns the original n-dimensional optimization problem into n independent scalar problems of lot sizing form. Each of these problems can be viewed as a two-player zero-sum game, which introduces some element of conservatism. Each scalar problem is then reformulated as a shortest path one and solved through linear programming over a receding horizon, a step that mirro…

Strategic Thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations

2016

This paper studies the strategic behavior of a large number of game designers and studies the scalability, stability and robustness of their allocations in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU). For each TU game, the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. In each game, a game designer allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The approach is based on the theory of mean-field games with heterogeneous groups in a multi-population regime.

Parallel distributed compensation for voltage controlled active magnetic bearing system using integral fuzzy model

2018

Parallel Distributed Compensation (PDC) for current-controlled Active Magnetic Bearing System (AMBS) has been quite effective in recent years. However, this method does not take into account the dynamics associated with the electromagnet. This limits the method to smaller scale applications where the electromagnet dynamics can be neglected. Voltage-controlled AMBS is used to overcome this limitation but this comes with serious challenges such as complex mathematical modelling and higher order system control. In this work, a PDC with integral part is proposed for position and input tracking control of voltage-controlled AMBS. PDC method is based on nonlinear Takagi-Sugeno (T-S) fuzzy model. …

Crowd-Averse Robust Mean-Field Games: Approximation via State Space Extension

2016

We consider a population of dynamic agents, also referred to as players. The state of each player evolves according to a linear stochastic differential equation driven by a Brownian motion and under the influence of a control and an adversarial disturbance. Every player minimizes a cost functional which involves quadratic terms on state and control plus a cross-coupling mean-field term measuring the congestion resulting from the collective behavior, which motivates the term “crowd-averse.” Motivations for this model are analyzed and discussed in three main contexts: a stock market application, a production engineering example, and a dynamic demand management problem in power systems. For th…

Consensus via multi-population robust mean-field games

2017

In less prescriptive environments where individuals are told ‘what to do’\ud but not ‘how to do’, synchronization can be a byproduct of strategic thinking,\ud prediction, and local interactions. We prove this in the context of multipopulation\ud robust mean-field games. The model sheds light on a multi-scale\ud phenomenon involving fast synchronization within the same population and\ud slow inter-cluster oscillation between different populations.

Robust Mean Field Games with Application to Production of an Exhaustible Resource

2012

International audience; In this paper, we study mean field games under uncertainty. We consider a population of players with individual states driven by a standard Brownian motion and a disturbance term. The contribution is three-fold: First, we establish a mean field system for such robust games. Second, we apply the methodology to an exhaustible resource production. Third, we show that the dimension of the mean field system can be significantly reduced by considering a functional of the first moment of the mean field process.

El ?Alivio de las Indias?. la Real Hacienda Filipina, 1565-1800

2019

Previo al estudio de la Real Hacienda filipina, el trabajo se centrará en la definición del marco territorial, la función del archipiélago en la estrategia imperial y la gran transformación de finales del siglo xVIII que afectó a su situación en el conjunto colonial. En segundo lugar, se expondrá el estado de la cuestión y las principales hipótesis sobre la evolución del Tesoro filipino y los problemas que planteaba su viabilidad, así como las fuentes y la metodología empleadas. A continuación se examinarán las grandes tendencias de la Hacienda en el largo plazo y los componentes del ingreso y el gasto, para finalizar con algunas conclusiones, en especial la respuesta a la siguiente pregunt…

Relaciones entre la monarquía Hispánica y el reino de Galicia: el papel de los Diputados Generales del Reino

2020

Sharing R&D investments in breakthrough technologies to control climate change

2017

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, a three-stage technology agreement formation game is solved. First, countries decide whether or not to sign up to the agreement. Then, in the second stage, the signatories (playing together) and the non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. In this stage, it is assumed that the signatories not only coordinate their levels of R&D investment but also pool their R&D efforts to fully internalize the spillovers of their investment in innovation. Finally, in the third stage, …