Search results for " Microeconomics"
showing 10 items of 45 documents
Normalizing biproportional methods
2002
International audience; Biproportional methods are used to update matrices: the projection of a matrix Z to give it the column and row sums of another matrix is R Z S, where R and S are diagonal and secure the constraints of the problem (R and S have no signification at all because they are not identified). However, normalizing R or S generates important mathematical difficulties: it amounts to put constraints on Lagrange multipliers, non negativity (and so the existence of the solution) is not guaranteed at equilibrium or along the path to equilibrium.
Managerial Behavior in the Lab: Information Disclosure, Decision Process and Leadership Style
2019
This paper reports the results from a lab experiment in which subjects playing the manager role can implement either an efficient / inegalitarian allocation or an inefficient / egalitarian allocation of payoffs. The experiment simulates a stylized managerial context by allowing the manager to manipulate information and select the decision process and by allowing the stakeholders to retaliate against the manager given different choices in the decision process. We found that the inefficient allocation is often selected and that this choice depends on whether the employees can retaliate against the manager and on whether the manager can hide information about the payoffs. The social preference…
Dimensions et dynamique de la coordination des soins de ville : une analyse économique
2019
Cet article vise à clarifier la notion de coordination en santé, à expliciter ses différentes dimensions et à revenir sur son statut dans un processus de production de soins. Une appréhension plus fine de la coordination permet de mieux analyser le bien-fondé, les difficultés des coordinations promues par les politiques de santé. Nous nous appuyons à la fois sur des études de terrain menées auprès de réseaux, de dispositifs de télémédecine et de MSP, et sur des approches théoriques de la coordination couvrant différents courants de l’économie des organisations.
Wine - investment: a profitable alternative investment or a simple long term pleasure?
2014
International audience; The purpose of this work is twofold: - to make a first historic analysis of performance through an investment in wine by comparing its performance with those that would have been possible to obtain at the same time by providing financial term investments; - to introduce the regional diversity of performance by considering the situation in the three selected geographic areas.
Le paradoxe du seuil de pauvreté endogène dans les indices de pauvreté
2007
The assignment of powers in an open-ended European Union
2003
Presented at CESIFO Conference “A Constitution for the EU”, February 2003; International audience; A major characteristic of the European Union is its transitional or evolving nature, in particular with regard to the assignment of powers between the two main levels of government. More precisely, under current constitutional arrangements, this evolving nature takes the form of an integration process which tends to be monotonous, that is, which can only with great difficulty be reversed. The paper is mainly devoted to the explanation of how this comes about and what effects this has on other features of the process. As a concluding remark, however, it suggests that an additional criterion for…
Horizontal competition in multilevel governmental settings
2013
28 pages; Governments situated on the same level of a multi-level governmental system compete with each other as well as with governments placed higher or lower. This paper is concerned with horizontal competition only. It discusses both competition based on the mobility of agents and competition based on comparisons of performance across jurisdictions - i.e., yardstick competition. With regard to the first kind, the focus is on the capacity of governments and voters to decide policies in spite of the mobility of agents. Some attention is also given to non-standard mechanisms in which mobility is manipulated so as to change the structure of the electorate. The paper considers two forms of h…
How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper
2013
22 pages; The significance of yardstick competition among governments is now confirmed with regard to fiscal variables. This is an important result but the significance of the mechanism must also be sought in a context broader than that of fiscal federalism and without limitation to relations and processes fully observable. Three points are made. Even in the case of governments trying to mimic each other over a single variable, additional variables are involved in an important way. Yardstick competition can be latent without being ineffective. Its major effect, then, is to set bounds to the choices that office-holders could think of making. Finally, the mechanism is a hidden albeit essentia…
Justice et inégalités: un amendement à la théorie de John Rawls
1992
National audience; On se demande si les principes de justice de Rawls ne sont pas exagérément inégalitaires, malgré leur côté "juste". On examine donc ce qu'il advient de l'optimum de Rawls, le maximin, quand de l'aversion pour l'inégalité" apparaît. Le maximin consiste à se placer sur un certain point de la courbe d'efficience, en admettant une certaine dose d'inégalité, pourvu que l'on donne le maximum possible aux plus défavorisés. On tient compte d'externalités en reprenant la notion d'envie sous la forme d'une aversion pour l'inégalité, essentiellement de la part des plus défavorisés. On ne peut plus raisonner sur la courbe frontière des rémunérations possibles et on démontre la validi…
On the Returns to Invention within Firms: Evidence from Finland
2018
International audience; In this paper we merge individual income data, firm-level data, patenting data, and IQ data in Finland over the period 1988–2012 to analyze the returns to invention for inventors and their coworkers or stakeholders within the same firm. We find that: (i) inventors collect only 8 percent of the total private return from invention; (ii) entrepreneurs get over 44 percent of the total gains; (iii) bluecollar workers get about 26 percent of the gains and the rest goes to white-collar workers. Moreover, entrepreneurs start with significant negative returns prior to the patent application, but their returns subsequently become highly positive.