Search results for "Bargaining Power"
showing 6 items of 16 documents
Hold up and intergenerational transmission of preferences
2004
This paper focuses on the formation, evolution and stability of the distribution of preferences in the population and its relationship with the investment and bargaining strategies in a simplified hold up problem. More precisely, in our model a population of infinitely-lived players (say, for example, firms) with homogeneous selfish or self-regarding preferences is pair-wise matched at each period with a population of an equal size of short-lived players (say, for example, workers) with heterogeneous preferences. Both types of player play a two-stage game. In the first stage, they decide separately but simultaneously whether to make a general or a relation-specific investment. The latter ty…
The Protection of the Weaker Parties in the Platform Economy
2018
Known by many names – platform, sharing, peer-to-peer (p2p), collaborative economy, and so on - entirely new business models have emerged in recent years, whereby online platforms use digital technologies to connect distinct groups of users in order to facilitate transactions for the exchange of assets and services. This dramatic shift in business organisation and market structure has opened an intense debate on the persisting need for those regulatory measures that typically protect the weaker party in bilateral business-to-consumer transactions. Widespread calls for a more “levelled playing field” makes a strong argument for reconsidering the scope of regulation and delegating regulatory …
La tutela del contraente debole nella platform economy
2018
Negli ultimi anni si è affermato un nuovo modello di attività produttiva nel quale piattaforme digitali mettono in contatto gruppi interdipendenti di agenti economici per facilitare lo scambio di beni e l’erogazione di servizi. Dinanzi a questa trasformazione nell’organizzazione d’impresa, nel coordinamento del lavoro e nella struttura dei mercati, il diffuso appello a stabilire un “terreno di gioco neutrale” diviene la premessa per proporre la deregolamentazione di interi comparti economici valorizzando la capacità di autogoverno delle piattaforme. Mentre le reazioni a queste proposte sono confinate quasi esclusivamente alla questione del lavoro, è mancata finora un’analisi più generale de…
Group Buying of Competing Retailers
2010
Under group buying, quantity discounts are offered based on the buyers' aggregated purchasing quantity, instead of individual quantities. As the price decreases with the total quantity, buyers receive lower prices than they otherwise would be able to obtain individually. Previous studies on group buying focus on the benefit buyers receive in reduced acquisition costs or enhanced bargaining power. In this paper, we show that buyers can instead get hurt from such cooperation. Specifically, we consider a two-level distribution channel with a single manufacturer and two retailers who compete for end customers. We show that, under linear demand curves, group buying is always preferable for symme…
Industry specialization and audit fees: a meta-analytic approach
2015
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive review of the literature that links auditor’s industry specialization (AIS) and audit fees (AFs) in order to clarify the puzzle of published results and provide overall conclusions that would help in future research. Design/methodology/approach To achieve this goal, the authors applied meta-analysis techniques in order to summarize, quantify and evaluate the published data related to the association between AIS and AF. Findings The meta-results are more robust when the proxy for AIS is the audit firm’s market share above 20 percent or the audit firm is jointly the national and city leader. For US-based studies, results are hom…
Networks of knowledge among unionized firms
2008
We develop a model of strategic networks in order to analyze how trade unions will affect the stability of R&D networks through which knowledge is transmitted in an oligopolistic industry. Whenever firms settle wages, the partially connected network is likely to emerge in the long run if and only if knowledge spillovers are large enough. However, when unions settle wages, the complete network is the unique stable network. In other words, the stronger the union bargaining power is, the more symmetric stable R&D networks will be. In terms of network efficiency, the partially connected network (when firms settle wages) does not Pareto dominate the complete network (when unions settle wages) an…