Search results for "Best response"

showing 5 items of 15 documents

Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences

2013

Proceeding at: 2nd Annual UECE Lisbon Meeting: Game Theory and Applications, took place 2010, November, 4-6, in Lisbon (Portugal). The event Web site http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~uece/lisbonmeetings2010/ In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players endowed with an idiosyncratic identity interact on a social network through strategic complements or substitutes. We classify the possible types of Nash equilibria under complete information, finding two thr…

TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUSComputer Science::Computer Science and Game Theoryjel:Z13Economics and EconometricsMatemáticasjel:D85Heterogeneity Networks Nash Equilibrium StabilitySocial networksjel:D03MicroeconomicsCOMPLEMENTARITIESsymbols.namesakeBayesian gameEconomicsCoordination gameStrategic complementsjel:C72ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTINGTheoryofComputation_GENERALNetwork formationNash equilibriumEquilibrium selectionBest responsejel:L14Bayesian equilibriumsymbolsHeterogeneityEpsilon-equilibriumMathematical economicsFinanceIncomplete informationGames and Economic Behavior
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Noncooperative dynamic games for inventory applications: A consensus approach

2008

We focus on a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game where the stage cost of a single player associated to a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players making the same decision. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize Nash equilibria and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multi-stage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns a seque…

TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUSDynamic gamesComputer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryMathematical optimizationCorrelated equilibriumSequential gameConsensus ProtocolsComputer scienceA-priori; Consensus protocols; Dynamic games; Finite horizons; Inventory; Inventory systems; Joint decisions; Multi stages; Nash equilibrium; Pareto-optimal; Single stages; Unilateral improvementsSymmetric equilibriumOutcome (game theory)Joint decisionsNash equilibriumFinite horizonsMulti stagessymbols.namesakeBayesian gameSettore ING-INF/04 - AutomaticaPareto-optimalA-prioriCoordination gameFolk theoremPrice of stabilityRisk dominanceNon-credible threatConsensus Protocols Dynamic Programming Game Theory InventoryInventory systemsTraveler's dilemmaNormal-form gameStochastic gameInventoryComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTINGTheoryofComputation_GENERALMinimaxConsensus protocolsEquilibrium selectionNash equilibriumBest responseSingle stagesRepeated gamesymbolsEpsilon-equilibriumSettore MAT/09 - Ricerca OperativaSolution conceptDynamic Programming Game TheoryUnilateral improvementsMathematical economicsGame theoryConsensus Protocols; Dynamic Programming Game Theory; Inventory
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Mean Field Linear Quadratic Games with Set Up Costs

2013

This paper studies linear quadratic games with set up costs monotonic on the number of active players, namely, players whose action is non-null. Such games arise naturally in joint replenishment inventory systems. Building upon a preliminary analysis of the properties of the best response strategies and Nash equilibria for the given game, the main contribution is the study of the same game under large population. We also analyze the influence of an additional disturbance in the spirit of the literature on H∞ control. Numerical illustrations are provided. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.

TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUSStatistics and ProbabilityComputer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryEconomics and EconometricsMathematical optimizationSequential gamedifferential games game theory control and optimizationJoint-replenishmentOutcome (game theory)symbols.namesakeMean field gamesGame theoryMathematicsMean field games; Linear quadratic differential games; Joint-replenishment[INFO.INFO-NI] Computer Science [cs]/Networking and Internet Architecture [cs.NI]Applied MathematicsNormal-form gameComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTINGoperational researchTheoryofComputation_GENERALScreening gameComputer Graphics and Computer-Aided DesignComputer Science ApplicationsComputational MathematicsComputational Theory and MathematicsNash equilibriumBest responseRepeated gamesymbolsLinear quadratic differential gamesSettore MAT/09 - Ricerca OperativaoptimizationGame theoryMathematical economicsDynamic Games and Applications
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Introspection and equilibrium selection in 2 � 2 matrix games

1994

Game theory lacks an explanation of how players' beliefs are formed and why they are in equilibrium. This is the reason why it has failed to make significant advances with the problem of equilibrium selection even for quite siniple games, as 2x2 games with two strict Nash equilibria. Our paper models the introspection process by which the selected equilibrium is achieved in this class of games. Players begin their analysis with imprecise priors, obtained under weak restrictions formulated as Axioms. For a large class of reasoning dynamics we obtain as the solution the risk dominant Nash equilibrium.

TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUSStatistics and ProbabilityComputer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryEconomics and EconometricsSequential equilibriumMathematical optimizationComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTINGSymmetric equilibriumTrembling hand perfect equilibriumTheoryofComputation_GENERALsymbols.namesakeMathematics (miscellaneous)Nash equilibriumEquilibrium selectionBest responseEconomicssymbolsStatistics Probability and UncertaintyEpsilon-equilibriumSolution conceptMathematical economicsSocial Sciences (miscellaneous)International Journal of Game Theory
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A game theoretic approach to MAC design for infrastructure networks

2010

Wireless network operation intrinsically assumes different forms of cooperation among the network nodes, such as sharing a common wireless medium without interfering, relaying frames belonging to other nodes, controlling the transmission power for optimizing spectrum reuse, coding cooperatively multiple frames for improving information redundancy, and so on. For this reason, Game Theory has been extensively employed to model wireless networks. In particular, we propose a game-theoretic approach for defining a generalized medium access protocol for slotted contention-based channels. Contention-based channels are largely adopted in data networks, e.g. in WiFi and WiMax networks and in some em…

game theorySettore ING-INF/03 - TelecomunicazioniComputer scienceWireless networkbusiness.industryDistributed computingNode (networking)ComputerSystemsOrganization_COMPUTER-COMMUNICATIONNETWORKSnetworks wifi game theoryThroughputnetworks; wifi; game theoryWiMAXShared resourceBase stationSettore ING-INF/04 - AutomaticaBest responsenetworksTelecommunications linkwifiWirelessbusinessGame theoryCommunication channelComputer network
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