6533b85ffe1ef96bd12c2408
RESEARCH PRODUCT
Introspection and equilibrium selection in 2 � 2 matrix games
Amparo UrbanoGonzalo Olcinasubject
TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUSStatistics and ProbabilityComputer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryEconomics and EconometricsSequential equilibriumMathematical optimizationComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTINGSymmetric equilibriumTrembling hand perfect equilibriumTheoryofComputation_GENERALsymbols.namesakeMathematics (miscellaneous)Nash equilibriumEquilibrium selectionBest responseEconomicssymbolsStatistics Probability and UncertaintyEpsilon-equilibriumSolution conceptMathematical economicsSocial Sciences (miscellaneous)description
Game theory lacks an explanation of how players' beliefs are formed and why they are in equilibrium. This is the reason why it has failed to make significant advances with the problem of equilibrium selection even for quite siniple games, as 2x2 games with two strict Nash equilibria. Our paper models the introspection process by which the selected equilibrium is achieved in this class of games. Players begin their analysis with imprecise priors, obtained under weak restrictions formulated as Axioms. For a large class of reasoning dynamics we obtain as the solution the risk dominant Nash equilibrium.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1994-09-01 | International Journal of Game Theory |