Search results for "C91"

showing 10 items of 11 documents

The many faces of human sociality: uncovering the distribution and stability of social preferences

2018

There is vast heterogeneity in the human willingness to weigh others' interests in decision making. This heterogeneity concerns the motivational intricacies as well as the strength of other-regarding behaviors, and raises the question how one can parsimoniously model and characterize heterogeneity across several dimensions of social preferences while still being able to predict behavior over time and across situations. We tackle this task with an experiment and a structural model of preferences that allows us to simultaneously estimate outcome-based and reciprocity-based social preferences. We find that non-selfish preferences are the rule rather than the exception. Neither at the level of …

2000 General Economics Econometrics and Financeindividual behaviorVerhaltensökonomieSocial preferencesECON Department of EconomicsEntscheidungsfindung10007 Department of Economics0502 economics and businessC91EconomicsEconometricsHeterogenitätddc:330Social preferences; Heterogeneity; Stability; Finite mixture models050207 economicsSocial preferencesStrukturmodellPreference (economics)Sociality050205 econometrics finite mixture models05 social sciencesStochastic gameBehavioral microeconomics (underlying principles)Representative agentstabilityPräferenzReciprocity (evolution)Altruismus330 EconomicsPredictive powerD03C49heterogeneityGeneral Economics Econometrics and FinanceValue (mathematics)laboratory
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Experimental duopolies under price guarantees

2011

In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs ("aggressive" and "soft" price-beating and price-matching) are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy. Our results show that PGs may lead close to the collusive outcome, depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the "aggressive" price-beating type.

DuopolisEconomics and EconometricsL11TheoryofComputation_GENERALProduct differentiationProduct differentiationOutcome (game theory)Price guaranteesExperimental duopoliesMicroeconomicsDiferenciació de productesPreusC91EconomicsSocial Sciences & HumanitiesDuopoly
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Measuring readiness for entrepreneurship: An information tool proposal

2016

Abstract A profound review of the literature on entrepreneurship reveals that it does not exist a specific information tool to measure the individuals’ readiness for entrepreneurship. The purpose of this research has been building such kind of instrument to estimate the individuals’ readiness for entrepreneurship. Its design takes in consideration the inclusion of the main variables identified by the literature as those most associated with entrepreneurial profiles. These variables have been grouped into three categories: sociological, psychological and managerial-entrepreneurial. Each group provides batteries of items which are evaluated thanks to a specific scoring system. The final objec…

Economics and EconometricsEntrepreneurshipScoring systemKnowledge managementEntrepreneurs' featuresEntrepreneurial capacityM1Disposición para el emprendimientoM2M5Management of Technology and Innovationddc:650C91lcsh:AZ20-9990502 economics and businesslcsh:Social sciences (General)050207 economicsBusiness and International ManagementMediciónHerramienta de informaciónMarketingMeasurementMeasure (data warehouse)M13business.industrySpecific-informationInformation tool05 social sciencesMlcsh:History of scholarship and learning. The humanitiesEntrepreneurs’ featuresReadiness for entrepreneurshipTest psicológicolcsh:H1-99Características de los emprendedoresPsycho-testsPsychologybusinessCapacidad emprendedoraSocial psychologyInclusion (education)050203 business & managementJournal of Innovation & Knowledge
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"Facta non verba" : an experiment on pledging and giving

2015

International audience; We design an experiment to investigate whether asking people to state how much they will donate to a charity (i.e., to pledge) increases their actual donation. Individuals’ endowment is either certain or a random variable. We study different types of pledges, namely, private, public and irrevocable, which differ in terms of the cost to the individual for not keeping the promise. We show that in absence of endowment uncertainty, private and public pledges are associated with lower donations as compared to donations in the no-pledge case: private pledges slightly reduce donations and public pledges reduce them more significantly. Donations increase with uncertainty (in…

Economics and EconometricsSociology and Political Sciencecharitable givingEndowmentmedia_common.quotation_subject050109 social psychologyMonetary economicsjel:D64Pledgejel:D03Dictator gameState (polity)Political sciencedictator game0502 economics and businessEconomics0501 psychology and cognitive sciencesStatistical dispersionJEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory Individual BehaviorJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D64 - Altruism • Philanthropy050207 economicsApplied PsychologyPledgemedia_commonLaw and economicsjel:C91business.industryCommunication05 social sciencesCharity givingPublic relations[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceCharity givingPledgeCommitmentCommunicationExperimentsCommitmentDonation[SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administrationbusinessExperimentsJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying PrinciplesCharity giving; Pledge; Commitment; Communication; ExperimentsJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General
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The Consistency of Fairness Rules: An Experimental Study

2010

In the last two decades, experimental papers on distributive justice have abounded. Two main results have been replicated. Firstly, there is a multiplicity of fairness rules. Secondly, fairness decisions differ depending on the context. This paper studies individual consistency in the use of fairness rules, as well as the structural factors that lead people to be inconsistent. We use a within-subject design, which allows us to compare individual behavior when the context changes. In line with the literature, we find a multiplicity of fairness rules. However, when we control for consistency, the set of fairness rules is considerably smaller. Only selfishness and strict egalitarianism seem to…

Economics and EconometricsSociology and Political Sciencejel:C91Justice Fairness Laboratory Experiments Self-serving bias ConsistencyComputer sciencemedia_common.quotation_subjectjel:D63Control (management)Context (language use)MicroeconomicsConsistency (negotiation)SelfishnessDistributive Justice Fairness Laboratory Experiments Self-serving bias ConsistencySelf-serving biasDistributive justiceSet (psychology)Social psychologyApplied PsychologyEgalitarianismmedia_common
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Temptation and commitment in the laboratory

2010

Temptation and self-control in intertemporal choice environments are receiving increasing attention in the theoretical economics literature. Nevertheless, there remains a scarcity of empirical evidence from controlled environments informing behavior under repeated temptations. This is unfortunate in light of the fact that in many natural environments, the same temptation must be repeatedly resisted. This paper fills that gap by reporting data from a novel laboratory study of economic decisions under repeat temptations. Subjects are repeatedly offered an option with instantaneous benefit that also entails a substantial reduction to overall earnings. We show that this option is "tempting" in …

Economics and Econometricstemptationself-controlmedia_common.quotation_subjectCommitTemptationIntertemporal choiceMicroeconomicsScarcity10007 Department of EconomicsIEW Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (former)C90C910502 economics and businessddc:330Economics050207 economicsEmpirical evidenceD11050205 econometrics media_commonCommitment devicewillpowerEarningsjel:C91commitment05 social sciencesjel:D11Self-controllaboratory experiment330 EconomicsSelf-control willpower temptation commitment laboratory experimentSocial psychologyFinance
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Choosing Who You Are: The Structure and Behavioral Effects of Revealed Identification Preferences

2017

Differences in individuals’ social identity have recently been shown to explain differences in behavior. But where do differences in social identity come from? Theory claims that identification allows people to affect their social identity by choosing who they are. Accordingly, this paper treats social identity as a choice and analyzes its behavioral effects. We find identification to be systematically related to behavioral heterogeneity in group-specific social preferences. In a first step, we measure identification preferences using a revealed preference approach in a laboratory experiment. Confirming social identity theory, participants reveal a stronger identification preference for gro…

IdentificationSocial distanceOutgroup DiscriminationAffect (psychology)Social preferencesPreferenceIdentification (information)Social PreferencesSocial IdentityRevealed preferenceC91ddc:330C92D03PsychologySocial identity theorySocial psychologySocial status
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Employee Types and Endogenous Organizational Design

2008

This discussion paper resulted in an article in the 'Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization' (2011). Volume 80, issue 3, pages 553-573. When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and monitoring. This paper reports the results from a laboratory experiment designed to test whether organizations make full effective use of the available preference types within their work force when drafting their organizational design. Our main finding is that they do not do so; although the importance of social …

jel:C91Organizational design; social preference types; experimentsjel:M50jel:J40
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Competing Against Simulated Equilibrium Price Dispersions: An Experiment on Internet-Assisted Search Markets

2005

In a four-treatment experiment, we test some of the hypotheses in García-Gallego et al. (2004) concerning competition among a number of firms of which some (or all) are indexed by a price-comparison engine facilitating buyers’ search process. In this paper, we isolate individual behavior from noise due to other players’ actions and learning, facing each subject with simulated rivals whose prices are extracted from mixed strategy equilibrium distributions. We find systematic deviations from both theoretical distributions and previous data obtained in sessions where all players were human. Specifically, departures of experimental data from the corresponding theoretical predictions are enhance…

jel:C91business.industryProcess (engineering)jel:D83Experimental datajel:D43Experimental economicsCompetition (economics)Strategyjel:L13EconomicsEconometricsThe InternetNoise (video)businessDivergence (statistics)Industrial organizationSSRN Electronic Journal
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Expected Behavior and Strategic Sophistication in the Dictator Game

2012

This paper provides novel results for the extensive literature on dictator games: recipients do not expect dictators to behave selfishly, but instead expect the equal split division. The predictions made by dictators are notably different: 45% predicted the zero contribution and 40% the equal split. These results suggest that dictators and recipients are heterogenous with regard to their degree of strategic sophistication and identify the dictator's decision power in a very different manner.

jel:C91jel:D63expectations strategic sophistication dictator game equal split guessingjel:D64
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