Search results for "Cartel"
showing 10 items of 106 documents
More firms, more competition? The case of the fourth operator in France's mobile phone market
2010
Accepted, Forthcoming; International audience; To foster competition the French government authorized a fourth operator, ‘Free', to enter the country's mobile phone market at the end of 2009 alongside Orange, SFR and Bouygues Telecom (BT), who held respectively one-half, one-third and one-sixth of the market. By using a stylized model of France's phone market, we have examined what we call the regulator's nightmares and dreams. If Cournot competition is in place before Free's entry, minimizing the total profit fails to maximize the consumer surplus and the total surplus; the maximum most realistic price fall is 6.7% compared to three-way competition and could be 1.7% only; if Orange, SFR an…
Trade Associations: Why Not Cartels?
2021
First published: 30 September 2020 The relevance of special interests lobbying in modern democracies can hardly be questioned. But if large trade associations can overcome the free riding problem and form effective lobbies, why do they not also threaten market competition by forming equally effective cartels? We argue that the key to understanding the difference lies in supply elasticity. The group discipline which works in the case of lobbying can be effective in sustaining a cartel only if increasing output is sufficiently costly ‐ otherwise the incentive to deviate is too great. The theory helps organizing a number of stylized facts within a common framework. This article has been accept…
Competing R&D Joint Ventures in Cournot oligopoly with spillovers
2014
This paper considers competition between R&D cartels, whereby prospective Cournot competitors coordinate their R&D decisions in order to maximize joint profit. It studies how R&D activity, aggregate profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare vary as the number of competing cartels varies. It also compares equilibrium with second best R&D, and discusses the policy implications of the results. The results show that the effects of R&D cartel competition depend on the welfare criterion adopted and on whether there are cooperative synergies or not.
IV Centenario de la Universidad de Valencia Octubre MCMII
1902
En la part inferior apareix ressenyada la programació dels actes que se celebraran amb motiu del quart centenari de la fundació de la Universitat En primer terme i ocupant quasi tot el cartell, es veu a la Saviesa representada en la figura d'una jove que duu en la mà dreta una torxa encesa i en l'esquerra un llibre. Darrere d'ella, un sol espargeix els seus llamps daurats sobre un cel estrellat; als seus peus hi ha una serp amb cap de drac. En l'extrem dret el segell de la Universitat
¡Guerra sin cuartel! No compres, sino a los precios marcados. Denuncia a quien no los respete, al que oculte mercancías, al acaparador. Son enemigos …
En la part esquerra diferents aliments amb un cartell de preus abusius, tatxat tot amb un aspa. Envoltant el dibuix està la llegenda
Contra el espionaje ¡Milicianos! No deis detalles sobre la situación de los frentes Ni a los camaradas Ni a los hermanos Ni a las novias.
Al capdavall "Ación (sic) Obreros litógrafos" En l'angle superior dret una cara amb una gran orella en actitud d'escoltar. En l'inferior esquerre, altra cara amb el dit índex en els llavis indicant silenci
La juventud estudiantil afirma sus deberes y sus derechos en la carta del estudiante del pueblo.
Dibuixos amb peu explicatiu dels sis deures i cinc drets dels estudiants, representant diversos moments de l'estudi, la companyonia juvenil, etc
Plan de la victoria
El Pla es refereix a la creació d'un Exèrcit Popular Regular, les seves reserves, moral i austeritat de guerra, indústria bèl·lica, etc. A la part esquerra del text hi ha dibuixos de combatents, segadors de blat i obrers en els seus llocs de treball en la maquinària de les fàbriques de guerra
La cartellisation des partenaires sociaux français : L’exemple de la réforme du financement syndical
2018
Alongside representatives of French employers, trade unions professionals form a cartel in the same way that some political parties are cartelised. These trade unions fight each other for the conquest of power but they also agree to make it almost impossible to create new unions. They share public and institutional resources and agree to maintain their power, resources and control over a large number of institutions, managed on a joint basis with employers' organisations. In 2014, this cartel obtained the creation of a tax on wages and salaries. The cartel members share the benefit of this tax without having to account for the use of these sums. This tax, and various subsidies, are the main…
Cartels Uncovered
2018
How many cartels are there? The answer is important in assessing the efficiency of competition policy. We present a Hidden Markov Model that answers the question, taking into account that often we do not know whether a cartel exists in an industry or not. Our model identifies key policy parameters from data generated under different competition policy regimes and may be used with time-series or panel data. We take the model to data from a period of legal cartels - Finnish manufacturing industries 1951 - 1990. Our estimates suggest that by the end of the period, almost all industries were cartelized.