Search results for "Coalition"
showing 10 items of 22 documents
Strategic Thinking under social influence: Scalability, stability and robustness of allocations
2016
This paper studies the strategic behavior of a large number of game designers and studies the scalability, stability and robustness of their allocations in a large number of homogeneous coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU). For each TU game, the characteristic function is a continuous-time stochastic process. In each game, a game designer allocates revenues based on the extra reward that a coalition has received up to the current time and the extra reward that the same coalition has received in the other games. The approach is based on the theory of mean-field games with heterogeneous groups in a multi-population regime.
Coalition building in the UN Security Council
2014
Political coalitions in the international system are still understudied in International Relations theory. This article claims that the formation of and variations in coalitions in the international system are affected by changes in their bargaining power and bargaining environment related to the global leadership cycle and by long-term organisational changes of the international political system. Identifying the Security Council as the institution in which states are more likely to keep their systemic preferences at the institutional level, the article studies the presence, formation and change of coalitions in the international system by testing variations in the behaviour of the Securit…
On robustness and dynamics in (un)balanced coalitional games
2012
In this paper we investigate robustness and dynamics for coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU games). In particular we study sequences of TU games. These sequences model dynamic situations in which the values of coalitions of players are not known beforehand, and are subject to changes over time. An allocation rule assigns a payoff to each player in each time period. This payoff is bounded by external restrictions, for example due to contractual agreements. Our main questions are: (i) under which conditions do the allocations converge to a core-element of the game, and (ii) when do the allocations converge to some specific allocation, the so-called nominal allocation? The main …
A Valencian-style Coalition Government: el Botànic
2020
Coalition governments are common in the European political landscape in various tiers ofgovernment. However, such coalitions were an exception in the history of the Valencian Autonomy until 2015, which marked a new stage with the so-called El Botànic governments. Which factors explain this change in the Valencian political system? What are the features of such coalition governments? Can this model be applied to other political systems? This paper addresses these and other issues. First, it looks at what led to coalition governments in both 2015 and 2019. Second, it studies the model of coalition government. The hypothesis tested is this: El Botànic is a coalition government whose success in…
Damned If You Do and Damned If You Don’t: Two Masters
2018
Available online: 05 June 2018 We study common agency problems in which two principals (groups) make costly commitments to incentives that are conditioned on imperfect signals of the agent's action. Our framework allows for incentives to be either rewards or punishments. For our basic model we obtain a unique equilibrium, which typically involves randomization by both principals. Greater similarity between principals leads to more aggressive competition. The principals weakly prefer punishment to rewards, sometimes strictly. With rewards an agent voluntarily joins both groups with punishment it depends on whether severe punishments are feasible and cheap for the principals. We study whether…
THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE
2013
A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs for the coalitions, and the solidarity value to obtain the payoffs for the players inside each coalition.
Collective Lands and Territories of Life: a Backgrounder on the International Land Coalition
2019
The article describes areas of collaboration between the ICCA Consortium and International Land Coalition
The Commission’s informal agenda-setting in the CFSP. Agenda leadership, coalition-building, and community framing
2020
This study contributes to the literature on informal governance by examining politics of informal agenda-setting in the European Commission. As a ‘hard case’, the paper examines how the European Commission exceeds limited legal Treaty provisions in foreign and security policy (CFSP). This system, where the Commission has come to play a more prominent role than stipulated in the treaties, is interpreted as a normalization of CFSP governance. Three complementary propositions on the informal agenda-setting role of the Commission are developed: agenda leadership (#1), coalition-building (#2), and community framing (#3). To illuminate these propositions, we examine their relevance across three e…
Distributed <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="TeX">$n$</tex-math></inline-formula>-Player Approachability and Consensus in…
2015
We study a distributed allocation process where, at each time, every player: i) proposes a new bid based on the average utilities produced up to that time, ii) adjusts such allocations based on the inputs received from its neighbors, and iii) generates and allocates new utilities. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging algorithm. We study conditions under which the average allocations reach consensus to any point within a predefined target set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Motivations arise in the context of coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) where the target set is any set of allocations that makes the grand …
INTERVENCIÓN PSICOSOCIAL EN ESPACIOS DE ALTA DIVERSIDAD EXPERIENCIA INTERCULTURAL Y BUENA PRAXIS
2021
espanolPsychosocial interventional approaches in reducing intergroup biases can be divided into two areas: intragroup and intergroup. The former includes work with counterstereotypespecimens (Plant et al., 2009), strategies based on cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957, cited in Rodriguez, 2019) and the promotion of empathy (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Stephan & Finlay, 1999). Intergroup strategies are those based on the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954, cited in Rodriguez, 2019) and those based on the theory of social categorization or sociocognitive strategies (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The research was ascribed to the interventional research model proposed by Rothman and Thomas (1994), c…