Search results for "D82"
showing 9 items of 9 documents
Conflict and segregation in networks: An experiment on the interplay between individual preferences and social influence
2016
We examine the interplay between a person's individual preference and the social influence others exert. We provide a model of network relationships with conflicting preferences, where individuals are better off coordinating with those around them, but where not all have a preference for the same action. We test our model in an experiment, varying the level of conflicting preferences between individuals. Our findings suggest that preferences are more salient than social influence, under conflicting preferences: subjects relate mainly with others who have the same preferences. This leads to two undesirable outcomes: network segregation and social inefficiency. The same force that helps peopl…
El componente de selección adversa de la horquilla de precios cotizada: una revisión de los modelos de estimación
2005
-Jose.E.Farinos@uv.es -Ana.M.Ibanez@uv.es Una de las principales preocupaciones en el área de la microestructura del mercado ha sido la estimación de los componentes no observables de la horquilla de precios a partir de las series de datos que proporcionan los mercados financieros, despertando quizá un mayor interés el de selección adversa por la implicaciones que supone la existencia del mismo. Esto ha provocado el desarrollo de numerosos modelos empíricos que, basándose en las propiedades estadísticas de las series de precios, proporcionan dichas estimaciones. La mayor disponibilidad de datos existentes en los mercados ha permitido el desarrollo en los últimos años de modelos basados en t…
Don't tell us: the demand for secretive bahaviour
2009
International audience
Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: When Should Messages be Sent?
2015
I consider a setting of complete but unverifiable information in which two agents enter a contractual relationship to induce mutually beneficial investments. As my main result, I establish that the famous irrelevance of contracting paradigm, that arises due to the detrimental effect of renegotiation, is resolved if there is a fixed point in time when actions have to be chosen and one accounts for the fact that renegotiation takes time. What drives my optimality result is that, by stipulating when the mechanism is to be played, the agents ensure that renegotiation is possible ex ante but not ex post.
Nash codes for noisy channels
2012
This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel. The sender's strategy, called a code, maps states of nature to signals. The receiver's best response is to decode the received channel output as the state with highest expected receiver payoff. Given this decoding, an equilibrium or "Nash code" results if the sender encodes every state as prescribed. We show two theorems that give sufficient conditions for Nash codes. First, a receiver-optimal code defines a Nash code. A second, more surprising observati…
Pragmatic languages with universal grammars
2012
Abstract This paper constructs the equilibrium for a specific code that can be seen as a “universal grammar” in a class of common interest Sender–Receiver games where players communicate through a noisy channel. We propose a Senderʼs signaling strategy which does not depend on either the game payoffs or the initial probability distribution. The Receiverʼs strategy partitions the set of possible sequences into subsets, with a single action assignment to each of them. The Senderʼs signaling strategy is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. when the Receiver responds best to the Senderʼs strategy, the Sender has no incentive to deviate. An example shows that a tie-breaking decoding is crucial for the block…
Are you a Good Employee or Simply a Good Guy? Infl?uence Costs and Contract Design.
2012
We develop a principal-agent model with a moral hazard problem in which the principal has access to a hard signal (the level of output) and a soft signal (the supervision signal) about the agent?s level of effort. We show that the agent?'s ability to manipulate the soft signal increases the cost of implementing the effcient equilibrium, leading to wage compression when the infl?uence cost is privately incurred by the agent. When manipulation activities negatively affect the agent?s productivity through the level of output, the design of infl?uence-free contracts that deter manipulation may lead to high-powered incentives. This result implies that high-productivity workers face incentive sch…
Entry with two correlated signals : the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects
2021
Recent advances in information and communication technologies have increased the incentives for firms to acquire information about rivals. These advances may have major implications for market entry because they make it easier for potential entrants to gather valuable information about, for example, an incumbent’s cost structure. However, little theoretical research has actually analyzed this question. This paper advances the literature by extending a one-sided asymmetric information version of Milgrom and Roberts’ (1982) limit pricing model. Here, the entrant is allowed access to an intelligence system (IS) of a certain precision that generates a noisy signal on the incumbent’s cost struct…
Testing For Asymmetric Information In Insurance Markets With Unobservable Types
2008
In two important recent papers, Finkelstein and McGarry [25] and Finkelstein and Poterba [28] propose a new test for asymmetric information in insurance markets that considers explicitly unobserved heterogeneity in insurance demand. In this paper we propose an alternative implementation of the Finkelstein-McGarry-Poterba test based on the identification of unobservable types by use of finite mixture models. The actual implementation of our test follows some recent advances on marginal modelling as applied to latent class analysis; formal testing procedures for the null of asymmetric information and for the hypothesis that private information is indeed multidimensional can be performed by im…