Search results for "Dictator game"
showing 6 items of 16 documents
Reply to Côté and Willer: New replication attempts provide no evidence that inequality moderates the effect of income on generosity
2020
Cote et al. (1) provided evidence that economic inequality moderates the effect of income on generosity. In their study, individuals with higher household income were less generous in a dictator game than poorer individuals only if they resided in a US state with comparatively large economic inequality. We questioned this finding because we did not find any evidence for the postulated moderation effect of economic inequality across three studies (ref. 2; for similar replication failures see ref. 3). However, our studies were conceptual rather than direct replications as we used different measures of generosity (charitable donations, behavior in a trust game, and volunteering) and also inclu…
Testing the Trust Game with undergraduates: An experiment with wealth heterogeneity
2017
Ponència presentada a 3rd International Conference on Higher Education Advances, HEAd’17, Universitat Politècnica de València, València, 2017 Trust, reciprocity and a fair distribution of resources are cruzial in the sustainability of any economic system. As a matter of fact, those are values that should be promoted among the new generations, especially among university students enrolled in degrees that are related to economics. Under this context, we are interested in enhancing criticism and active reflection among undergraduates with respect to social values. With such a goal in mind, we designed a two step classroom task that includes playing the Trust Game (TG) in the first place and, s…
Carry a big stick, or no stick at all
2016
We investigate the effect of costly punishment in a trust game with endowment heterogeneity. Our findings indicate that the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments determines the effect of punishment on trust and trustworthiness. Punishment fosters trust only when the investor is wealthier than the allocator. Otherwise, punishment fails to promote trusting behavior. As for trustworthiness, the effect is just the opposite. The higher the difference between the investor and the allocator’s initial endowments, the less willing allocators are to pay back. We discuss the consistency of our findings with social preference models (like inequality aversion, reciprocit…
Believing in Hidden Plots is Associated with Decreased Behavioral Trust: Conspiracy Belief as Greater Sensitivity to Social Threat or Insensitivity T…
2022
Abstract Past research has demonstrated that conspiracy belief is linked to a low level of self-reported general trust. In four experimental online studies (total N = 1105) we examined whether this relationship translated into actual behavior. Specifically, since the decision to trust relies on the ability to detect potential social threat, we tested whether conspiracy believers are better at detecting actual threat, worse at detecting the absence of threat, or simply trust less, irrespective of any social cue. To this end, participants played multiple, independent rounds of the trust game, a behavioral measure for interpersonal trust. We manipulated social threat by presenting photographs …
Active Learning on Trust and Reciprocity for Undergraduates
2019
We propose a teaching activity aimed at promoting social values, such as trust and reciprocity, among undergraduate students in economics and related degrees. We present our pilot experience of what we call RED&ndash
Expected Behavior and Strategic Sophistication in the Dictator Game
2012
This paper provides novel results for the extensive literature on dictator games: recipients do not expect dictators to behave selfishly, but instead expect the equal split division. The predictions made by dictators are notably different: 45% predicted the zero contribution and 40% the equal split. These results suggest that dictators and recipients are heterogenous with regard to their degree of strategic sophistication and identify the dictator's decision power in a very different manner.