Search results for "Econometric"
showing 10 items of 3780 documents
What makes carbon traders cluster their orders?
2014
Abstract The ability to trade large amounts of assets at low costs could be hindered when the size of the orders is concentrated at specific trade sizes. This paper documents evidence of size clustering behavior in the European Carbon Futures Market and analyzes the circumstances under which it happens. Our findings show that carbon trades are concentrated in sizes of one to five contracts and in multiples of five. We have also demonstrated that more clustered prices have more clustered sizes, suggesting that price and size resolution in the European Carbon Market are complementary and that carbon traders round both the price and the size of their orders. Finally, the analysis of the key de…
ON HIGH-SKILL AND LOW-SKILL EQUILIBRIA: A MARKOV CHAIN APPROACH
2006
In this paper we propose to study the dynamics of human capital accumulation by means of a Markov chain. We identify the conditions for the emergence of ergodic and nonergodic dynamics, and relate them to various characteristics of an economic system. The model may generate high-skill and low-skill equilibria as well as intermediate situations. Policy implications are also discussed.
Returns to scale in a matching model: evidence from disaggregated panel data
2005
The returns to scale in the matching function play an important role in models with endogenous search effort. Due to positive externalities, increasing returns to scale in matching can support high or low activity equilibrium in the labour market. In this study, we examine this issue using panel data from Finnish employment offices. The study finds that the results from the Cobb–Douglas and translog specification are qualitatively different. The CD specification of the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale. The translog specification, in turn, exhibits increasing returns to scale. The elasticity estimate for returns, using the preferred specification and minimum and maximum s…
THE ROLE OF SUNK COSTS IN THE DECISION TO INVEST IN R&D
2009
We present a dynamic empirical model of a firm's R&D decisions that is consistent with the existence of sunk R&D costs, taking into account that these costs may differ between small and large firms, and among different technological regimes. We estimate a multivariate dynamic discrete choice model using firm-level data of Spanish manufacturing for 1990–2000. Conditional on firm heterogeneity and serially correlated unobservable factors, we find that R&D history matters. This true state dependence allows inferring the existence of sunk R&D costs associated with performing R&D. Sunk R&D costs are found to be higher for large, high-tech firms.
Compensation Options in Joint Ventures. A Real Options Approach
2007
This research focuses on a cluster of dynamic reallocation and restatement of ownership clauses contained in joint venture agreements. These clauses, with potentially significant financial implications, govern the transfer of rights between the parties on two key financial issues: the allocation of profits and losses and the ownership interests in the joint venture. The central contribution of this research is to consider these clauses themselves as non-standard real options and to propose a methodology for assessing their values. Determination of such values will be essential throughout the joint venture negotiation process. In addition, we provide valuable information on another key quest…
The optimal degree of commitment in a negotiation with a deadline
2004
This note explores the consequences of a player's freedom of choice over his degree of commitment for the bargaining outcome. In particular, we modify the nonstationary structure of Fershtman and Seidmann (1993)'s bargaining by allowing one player to possess imperfect commitments where the degree of commitment is chosen prior to the negotiation stage. We show that a player optimally chooses an intermediate degree of irrevocability provided the costs of increasing the degree of commitment are small enough. In this case, not only an immediate agreement is reached but also the commitment is effective.
Partially revocable commitments in a negotiation with a deadline
2004
Abstract [Fershtman, C., Seidmann, D., 1993. Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment. Journal of Economic Theory 60, 306–321] showed that the presence of an irrevocable endogenous commitment with a fixed deadline results in the so called deadline effect. In this paper we analyse the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in an infinite horizon negotiation in which a deadline can arise with positive probability. We obtain that when the commitment possesses a sufficiently large revocable part not only the inefficient delays disappear and an immediate agreement is reached but also the commitment has a value. On the other hand, …
Offshoring along the production chain
2009
Recent contributions on offshoring often assume that firms can freely split their production process into separate steps which can be ranked according to the cost savings from producing abroad. We replace this assumption by the notion of a technologically determined sequence of production steps. In our model, cost savings from offshoring fluctuate along the production chain, and moving unfinished goods across borders causes transport costs. We show that, in such a setting, firms may refrain from offshoring even if relocating individual steps would be advantageous in terms of offshoring costs, or they may offshore (almost) the entire production chain to save transport costs. Small variations…
Exit with vertical product differentiation
2005
Abstract This paper presents a duopoly model of exit from a declining industry with vertical product differentiation. It extends previous IO models on exit that have so far ignored demand effects. The model shows how the interplay between demand and technological factors determine the order of exit. Therefore, demand factors are relevant and should be taken into account. Thus, the firm with a longer tenure as a profitable monopolist does not necessarily outlast its rival. In addition, this paper argues that the low-quality firm may find it optimal to stay in the market despite making temporary losses to outlast its rival.
Duopoly signal jamming
1993
This paper examines a repeated duopoly market with heterogeneous outputs. Firms have (common) prior beliefs over the values of an unknown parameter of each firm's demand curve. Firms cannot observe rivals' quantities, but can observe market prices, which are subject to random disturbances and hence provide noisy information that firms use to update their beliefs concerning the unknown parameters' values. Each firm can potentially signal jam, or strategically vary its output level in order to manipulate the distribution of likely market prices and hence the likely inferences drawn by the opponent. We find that the opportunity to signal-jam introduces two conflicting effects, arising out of t…