Search results for "GAME"
showing 10 items of 1663 documents
Lessons learned on student engagement from the nature of pervasive socio‐digital interests and related network participation of adolescents
2021
The rise of modern socio-digital technologies has fundamentally changed the everyday environments in which young people communicate with each other and cultivate interests. To gain a more sophisticated understanding of this phenomenon, this study provides in-depth, qualitative insights into adolescents’ experiences of their socio-digital developmental ecologies. The 15 interview participants were recruited based on a previously conducted questionnaire. The semi-structured theme interview addressed the socio-digital aspects of the participants’ interest-driven behaviours and related networks with the aid of participant-generated egocentric maps. The data not only qualitatively enrich the pic…
An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?
2022
AbstractThis paper studies how the investment in adaptation can influence the participation in an international environmental agreement (IEA) when countries decide in adaptation before they choose emissions. Three types of agreements are studied, a mitigation agreement for which countries coordinate their decisions only on emissions; an adaptation agreement for which there is only coordination when countries decide their levels of adaptation and a complete agreement when there is coordination in both emissions and adaptation levels. In every case, we assume that the degree of effectiveness of adaptation is bounded from above, in order words, adaptation can alleviate the environmental proble…
IL JOBS ACT DEI LAVORATORI AUTONOMI E LE STRATEGIE DI TUTELA DEL CONTRAENTE DEBOLE NEI RAPPORTI “B2B”: IL METICCIAMENTO DELLE REGOLE COME PRELUDIO A …
2018
Il saggio analizza gli aspetti di interesse prettamente civilistico del cosiddetto "Jobs Act dei lavoratori autonomi" (legge 22 maggio 2017, n. 81), mettendo in evidenza le novità in tema di strategie di tutela del contraente debole-lavoratore autonomo con specifico riferimento all'inserimento di clausole abusive nei contratti ricadenti sotto il suo ambito di operatività e all'abuso di dipendenza economica, e segnalando i tratti di continuità dello strumentario scelto con soluzioni proprie della legislazione consumeristica, nell'ottica di una possibile convergenza tra discipline .
How paradoxical is ‘paradoxical’ outcome? : Different pathways and implications
2021
The present special issue includes single and multiple case studies which report on the phenomenon of ‘paradoxical’ outcomes in psychotherapy, operationalized as discordant outcome assessments within the same case. In an attempt to find ground for my published response, I endeavored to juxtaposition the cases from the different studies, and by doing that gain an overview of the contributions and arguments. As a result of that exercise, I suggest three different types of paradoxical outcome with different pathways and implications. Discussing the concept of ‘illusory mental health’ as a possible explanation for paradoxical outcome, I suggest that self-ratings within a nonclinical range, give…
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
2013
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their “exclusiveness” we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently “extractive” in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.
A strategic approach for the discounted Shapley values
2014
The family of discounted Shapley values is analyzed for cooperative games in coalitional form. We consider the bargaining protocol of the alternating random proposer introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (Econometrica 64:357–380, 1996). We demonstrate that the discounted Shapley values arise as the expected payoffs associated with the bargaining equilibria when a time discount factor is considered. In a second model, we replace the time cost with the probability that the game ends without agreements. This model also implements these values in transferable utility games, moreover, the model implements the \(\alpha \)-consistent values in the nontransferable utility setting.
Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
2010
Abstract A new axiomatic characterization of the two-step Shapley value Kamijo (2009) is presented based on a solidarity principle of the members of any union: when the game changes due to the addition or deletion of players outside the union, all members of the union will share the same gains/losses.
Expected Behavior and Strategic Sophistication in the Dictator Game
2012
This paper provides novel results for the extensive literature on dictator games: recipients do not expect dictators to behave selfishly, but instead expect the equal split division. The predictions made by dictators are notably different: 45% predicted the zero contribution and 40% the equal split. These results suggest that dictators and recipients are heterogenous with regard to their degree of strategic sophistication and identify the dictator's decision power in a very different manner.
Delegated agency in multiproduct oligopolies with indivisible goods
2010
This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. Our analysis contributes to the literature on delegated agency games with direct externalities and complete information, extending the insights by Berheim and Whinston (1986, a , b) to markets with indivisibilities. By analyzing a kind of extended contract schedules - mixed bundling prices - that discriminate on exclusivity, the paper shows that efficient equilibria always exist in such settings. There may also exist inefficient equilibria in which the agent chooses a subopti…
On Capturing Oil Rents with a National Excise Tax Revisited
2004
In this paper the scope of Bergstrom’s (1982) results is studied. Moreover, his analysis is extended assuming that extraction cost is directly related to accumulated extractions. For the case of a competitive market it is found that the optimal policy is a constant tariff if extraction is costless. However, with depletion effects, the optimal tariff must ultimately be decreasing. For the case of a monopolistic market the results depend crucially on the kind of strategies the importing country governments can play and on whether the monopolist chooses the price or extraction rate. For a price-setting monopolist it is shown that the importing countries cannot use a tariff to capture monopoly …