Search results for "Game"
showing 10 items of 1663 documents
On Capturing Rent from a Non-Renewable Resource International Monopoly: A Dynamic Game Approach
2005
In this paper we model the case of an international non-renewable resource monopolist as a dynamic game between a monopolist and n importing countries governments, and we investigate whether a tariff on resource imports can be advantageous for the consumers of the importing countries when the monopolist sets the price and the importing countries governments act in a non-cooperative way. We find that a tariff is advantageous for the consumers even when there is not commitment to the trade policy although the part of the rent that can be reaped by the importing countries decreases substantially with the number of importing countries. The optimality of the tariff in our dynamic game is explain…
BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE
2006
We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.
Coordination games with asymmetric payoffs: An experimental study with intra-group communication
2020
Abstract Two alternative modes of reasoning in coordination games are prominently discussed in the literature: level-k thinking and team reasoning. In order to differentiate between the two modes of reasoning, we experimentally investigate payoff-asymmetric coordination games using an intra-group communication design that incentivizes subjects to explain the reasoning behind their decisions. We find that the reasoning process is significantly different between games. In payoff-symmetric games, team reasoning plays an important role for coordination. In payoff-asymmetric games, level-k reasoning results in frequent miscoordination. Our study clearly illustrates how small differences between …
Goalkeeper: A Zero-Sum Exergame for Motivating Physical Activity
2021
Incentives and peer competition have so far been employed independently for increasing physical activity. In this paper, we introduce Goalkeeper, a mobile application that utilizes deposit contracts for motivating physical activity in group settings. Goalkeeper enables one to set up a physical exercise challenge with a group of peers that deposit a fixed amount of money for participating. If a peer fails to complete the challenge, Goalkeeper redistributes their deposit to those who managed to complete it (i.e., zero-sum game). We evaluated the potential of Goalkeeper in increasing physical activity with a total of 50 participants over the course of 2 months. Our findings suggest that deposi…
2002
This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases t…
Determinants of evaluation of team performance
1976
Abstract.— The purpose of this study was to examine factors affecting the evaluation of the achievement behavior of a group. Subjects were asked to play the role of team members who have to convey their feedback to the whole team right after the performance. 214 subjects (males and females, high and low achievers) evaluated the achievement behavior of a group, a sports team. They were given knowledge of the group's performance outcomes (5 outcomes from clear win to clear loss), of the group's ability (yes or no) and of the effort (yes or no) expended by the group members. These factors yielded the 20 situations judged by each subject. In addition, half of the subjects evaluated a team perfo…
Biopharmaceutical alliances and competition: a real options game approach
2013
The eSports conundrum: is the sports sciences community ready to face them? A perspective
2020
The reality of eSports is something much more complex than individual users playing video games. There are several characteristics that eSports have in common with traditional sports: from the spirit of competition to the structural composition of the teams, including the increase in performance with training and practice, up to the injuries and physical and psychological stress of the athlete. The number of scientific papers interested in this reality is still relatively low, although in recent years there has been a significant increase in this regard. Probably the lack of knowledge of the world of eSports by inexperts can represent an initial obstacle in the approach to this environment.…
Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict.
2011
Understanding how societies resolve conflicts between individual and common interests remains one of the most fundamental issues across disciplines. The observation that humans readily incur costs to sanction uncooperative individuals without tangible individual benefits has attracted considerable attention as a proximate cause as to why cooperative behaviours might evolve. However, the proliferation of individually costly punishment has been difficult to explain. Several studies over the last decade employing experimental designs with isolated groups have found clear evidence that the costs of punishment often nullify the benefits of increased cooperation, rendering the strong human tenden…
Codification schemes and finite automata
2000
This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design both of communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by boundedly rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both theories to improve the existing automata bounds of Neyman¿s (1998) work on finitely repeated games played by finite automata.