6533b7dcfe1ef96bd12734b6
RESEARCH PRODUCT
BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE
Vicente CalabuigGonzalo OlcinaAntoni Cunyatsubject
Commitment deviceComputer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryGeneral Computer ScienceTruncationFinite horizonC78 [Bargaining endogenous commitment delays uncertain deadline JEL Classification]jel:M2MicroeconomicsEconomicsjel:C0Infinite horizonStatistics Probability and UncertaintyBusiness and International Managementjel:D5jel:B4Mathematical economicsComputer Science::Operating Systemsjel:C6jel:D7Positive probabilityComputer Science::Databasesjel:C7Event (probability theory)description
We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.
| year | journal | country | edition | language |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2006-12-01 | International Game Theory Review |