Search results for "jel:C0"
showing 5 items of 5 documents
BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE
2006
We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.
Drifting Down the Technologization of Life: Could Choreography-Based Interaction Design Support us in Engaging with the World and our Embodied Living?
2013
The development of interactive technology is often based on the assumption of need to reduce the physical action and cognitive load of the user. However, recent conceptualizations, supported by research in various fields of science, emphasize human physical action in cognitive processes and knowledge formation. In fact, physical and closely related imaginary movement can be seen as the quintessence of humanity. Acknowledging this should imply a new approach to the design of interactive technology. In the current study, we propose a choreographic approach for shifting the focal point of interaction design to the aspects of human activity and movement within a technologized context. Hence, th…
THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE
2013
A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs for the coalitions, and the solidarity value to obtain the payoffs for the players inside each coalition.
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
2013
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their “exclusiveness” we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently “extractive” in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.
Long-term memories of developed and emerging markets: Using the scaling analysis to characterize their stage of development
2005
The scaling properties encompass in a simple analysis many of the volatility characteristics of financial markets. That is why we use them to probe the different degree of markets development. We empirically study the scaling properties of daily Foreign Exchange rates, Stock Market indices and fixed income instruments by using the generalized Hurst approach. We show that the scaling exponents are associated with characteristics of the specific markets and can be used to differentiate markets in their stage of development. The robustness of the results is tested by both Monte-Carlo studies and a computation of the scaling in the frequency-domain.