Search results for "jel:D7"
showing 10 items of 15 documents
BARGAINING WITH COMMITMENT UNDER AN UNCERTAIN DEADLINE
2006
We consider an infinite horizon bargaining game in which a deadline can arise with positive probability and where players possess an endogenous commitment device. We show that for any truncation of the game, the equilibrium agreement can only take place if the deadline arises within this finite horizon. Since the deadline is an uncertain event, the equilibrium exhibits agreements which are delayed with positive probability.
Reforms and decentralization: friends or foes
2013
Systemic concerns about markets, capitalism and the role of the state in the economy are salient again. Relatively large-scale reforms of economic and social arrangements are seriously considered. Historical experience suggests that reforms of that kind are sometimes associated with important changes in institutional arrangements pertaining to political decentralization. To explore the relationship between economic reforms and decentralization, the paper argues that a reform has two dimensions. It is a process and it is a design. The organization of the paper is inspired by that distinction. For economists, it seems natural to reason in terms of design -- that is, to perceive reform as the …
Decentralization as an incentive scheme when regional differences are large
2010
It has been suggested that large regional differences could be an obstacle to that part of the political accountability of office-holders which is based on yardstick competition among governments. The paper addresses that question and concludes that the obstacle is not too serious in general. The second part of the paper is devoted to the persistent economic underperformance of some regions in countries such as Germany, Italy and (with regard to regions overseas) France. How is it that the mechanism of yardstick competition induces a convergence of economic performance among European Union member countries, even those particularly poor initially, but fails to induce all the underperforming …
Strategic sharing of a costly network
2012
We study minimum cost spanning tree problems for a set of users connected to a source. Prim’s algorithm provides a way of finding the minimum cost tree mm. This has led to several definitions in the literature, regarding how to distribute the cost. These rules propose different cost allocations, which can be understood as compensations and/or payments between players, with respect to the status quo point: each user pays for the connection she uses to be linked to the source. In this paper we analyze the rationale behind a distribution of the minimum cost by defining an a priori transfer structure. Our first result states the existence of a transfer structure such that no user is willing to …
Determinantes Políticos de las Transferencias Discrecionales. Evidencia de la Provincia de Córdoba, Argentina
2005
Este trabajo examina el impacto de la táctica política en la distribución de las transferencias de fondos discrecionales entre el gobierno provincial y los municipios. Se analizan las diferentes teorías basadas en modelos partidistas y no partidistas, contrastando las mismas empíricamente para los municipios de la provincia de Córdoba, en Argentina. Los resultados obtenidos permiten confirmar la existencia de factores políticos y económicos como determinantes de la asignación de las transferencias discrecionales y si bien ninguno de los modelos teóricos explicados se ven reflejados en sentido estricto, sí se observa una combinación entre ellos. This work examines the impact of political tac…
THE SHAPLEY-SOLIDARITY VALUE FOR GAMES WITH A COALITION STRUCTURE
2013
A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are willing to use with players outside their coalition. The Shapley value is therefore used to compute the aggregate payoffs for the coalitions, and the solidarity value to obtain the payoffs for the players inside each coalition.
Construction de logements sociaux et stratégies électorales locales,
2013
Our article examines if local incumbents’ choices regarding social housing construction are influenced by strategic electoral considerations, which might foil the French state’s efforts in favour of greater social mixity. By constructing a probabilistic voting model which integrates a partially mobile population, we show that such strategic considerations let the political choices of neighbouring municipalities become interdependent, and that the intensity of the resulting strategic inter-actions varies in function of the local population’s mobility. These propositions are confirmed by our empirical analysis concerning social housing construction in the Greater Lyon region. A local incumben…
A System Dynamics Approach to Analysing the Effect of Clientelism on Public Organizations Performance in Italy
2010
This paper tries to analyse the effects of political clientelism on the performance of public utilities and organizations in Italy. Shortly, clientelism consists in a series of reciprocal convenience-based relationships between politicians and individuals, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions in terms of economic, social and political consequences. The motivation of this research stems from the fact that analysing the effect of clientelism may contribute in (1) improving the quality of electoral strategies and the resulting public policies and (2) managing the performance of public organizations according to a sustainable perspective. Hence, the key is…
NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A MODEL OF MULTIPRODUCT PRICE COMPETITION: AN ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
2003
We study the market interaction of a finite number of single-product firms and a representative buyer, where the buyer consumes bundles of these goods. The buyers' value function determines their willingness to pay for subsets of goods. We show that subgame perfect Nash-equilibrium outcomes are solutions of the linear relaxation of an integer programming assignment problem and that they always exits. The (subgame perfect) Nash-equilibrium price set is characterized by the Pareto frontier of the associated dual problem's projection on the firms' price vectors. We identify the Nash-equilibrium prices for monotonic buyers' value functions and, more importantly, we show that some central soluti…
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
2013
In a model of evolution driven by conflict between societies more powerful states have an advantage. When the influence of outsiders is small we show that this results in a tendency to hegemony. In a simple example in which institutions differ in their “exclusiveness” we find that these hegemonies will be inefficiently “extractive” in the sense of having inefficiently high taxes, high compensation for state officials, and low welfare.