Search results for "H77"

showing 8 items of 8 documents

Fondos estructurales y política regional en la Unión Europea

2000

The present work examines the reasons that gave rise to European Regional Policy and describes its principles and basic objectives, as well as the operational transformations it underwent from the 1988 Structural Fund reform till the approval of the Agenda 2000. Its ability to correct regional imbalances is subsequently compared with the limited ability of European Public Finance to carry out some of the functions performed by central governments in States with a federal political structure, which results in disparity between regional income levels and the corresponding tax balances. Finally, the achievements and limitations of European Regional Policy are assessed on a wide basis rather th…

jel:F15European Regional Policy Regional Programming Structural Funds Regional Tax Balances Regional Imbalances.jel:R58jel:H77jel:F02jel:H87CIRIEC-España, revista de economía pública, social y cooperativa
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How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper

2013

22 pages; The significance of yardstick competition among governments is now confirmed with regard to fiscal variables. This is an important result but the significance of the mechanism must also be sought in a context broader than that of fiscal federalism and without limitation to relations and processes fully observable. Three points are made. Even in the case of governments trying to mimic each other over a single variable, additional variables are involved in an important way. Yardstick competition can be latent without being ineffective. Its major effect, then, is to set bounds to the choices that office-holders could think of making. Finally, the mechanism is a hidden albeit essentia…

JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting BehaviordecentralizationContext (language use)Public choiceDecentralizationCompetition (economics)JEL : H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • SecessionGovernmentsYardstickJEL : H - Public Economics/H.H1 - Structure and Scope of Government/H.H1.H11 - Structure Scope and Performance of Governmentfederalism0502 economics and business050602 political science & public administrationEconomics[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances050207 economicspolitical yardstick competition[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJEL : H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H70 - GeneralComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUSPublic economicsJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • Secession05 social sciencesJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H70 - General16. Peace & justice[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Financepolitical yardstick competitionfederalismdecentralizationsystemsJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H1 - Structure and Scope of Government/H.H1.H11 - Structure Scope and Performance of Government0506 political scienceYardstick competitionsystemsFiscal federalismFederalismJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting BehaviorEconomics and Finance Politics and Public PolicyPublic finance
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Mantenimiento temporal de la equidad horizontal en el sistema de financiación autonómica.

2011

Este trabajo propone un mecanismo de actualización del sistema de financiación autonómica que mantiene la equidad horizontal a lo largo del tiempo, al que se denomina mecanismo de las “Relatividades Constantes”. En este contexto, el trabajo examina críticamente el concepto de necesidades de gasto utilizado en la financiación autonómica española, propone una definición operativa del mismo, e identifica un índice global de necesidades que replica la distribución de recursos normativos del nuevo modelo de financiación. Utilizando este índice global, el artículo ilustra empíricamente el mecanismo de actualización propuesto y compara los resultados con los obtenidos a partir de la regla existent…

financiación autonómica equidad horizontal actualización.jel:H73jel:H71jel:H77Hacienda Pública Española/Revista de Economía Pública
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Determinantes Políticos de las Transferencias Discrecionales. Evidencia de la Provincia de Córdoba, Argentina

2005

Este trabajo examina el impacto de la táctica política en la distribución de las transferencias de fondos discrecionales entre el gobierno provincial y los municipios. Se analizan las diferentes teorías basadas en modelos partidistas y no partidistas, contrastando las mismas empíricamente para los municipios de la provincia de Córdoba, en Argentina. Los resultados obtenidos permiten confirmar la existencia de factores políticos y económicos como determinantes de la asignación de las transferencias discrecionales y si bien ninguno de los modelos teóricos explicados se ven reflejados en sentido estricto, sí se observa una combinación entre ellos. This work examines the impact of political tac…

Economics as a scienceCórdoba ArgentinaStatisticsjel:D72Transferencias discrecionales; Táctica política; Córdoba Argentinatáctica políticajel:H77PolíticaHB71-74transferencias discrecionalesHA1-4737
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Seat Competitiveness and Redistricting: Evidence from Voting on Municipal Mergers

2013

We analyze how (anticipated) changes in the competitiveness of the seats of municipal councilors affect their voting behavior over municipal mergers. The competitiveness of the seats changes because the merger changes the composition of political competitors and the number of available seats in the next election. We use this variation for identification and find that the smaller the increase in the competitiveness of a councilor's seat, the more likely he is to vote for the merger. These effects are not related to the behavioral responses of the voters, but arise from the councilors’ desire to avoid electoral competition.

media_common.quotation_subjectjel:D72jel:C34jel:C35Competitor analysisjel:H77jel:H11jel:C36PoliticsRedistrictingMarket economyVotingVoting behaviorSeat competitiveness local politics municipal mergersBusinessEconomic systemmedia_commonSSRN Electronic Journal
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The assignment of powers in an open-ended European Union

2003

Presented at CESIFO Conference “A Constitution for the EU”, February 2003; International audience; A major characteristic of the European Union is its transitional or evolving nature, in particular with regard to the assignment of powers between the two main levels of government. More precisely, under current constitutional arrangements, this evolving nature takes the form of an integration process which tends to be monotonous, that is, which can only with great difficulty be reversed. The paper is mainly devoted to the explanation of how this comes about and what effects this has on other features of the process. As a concluding remark, however, it suggests that an additional criterion for…

JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting BehaviorJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • SecessionEuropean uniontransitiongradualism[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceconstitutionConstitutionJEL: F - International Economics/F.F0 - General/F.F0.F02 - International Economic Order and IntegrationEuropean integration European union constitution gradualism transitionEuropean Integrationddc:330[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and financesEuropean UnionEuropean integration[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceGradualism
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Administrative Capacity as a Constraint to Fiscal Decentralization. The Case of Romania and Poland

2020

This paper considers the problem of administrative capacity as one of the main requirements that the accession countries seeking EU membership had to meet, and as a prerequisite to the decentralization of their public sectors and public finances. The selected decentralization problems are analyzed using the cases of two countries: Romania and Poland. The results of a theoretical and practical evaluation of administrative capacity as a likely obstacle to fiscal decentralization are presented taking account of the different levels of decentralization in Poland and Romania. A comparative analysis of Romania and Poland shows that administrative capacity can be a constraint for fiscal decentrali…

administracja publiczna0211 other engineering and technologiesFinancial independencepodatki lokalne02 engineering and technologyDecentralizationAccessionSubsidiarityddc:330050602 political science & public administrationH77H70local selfgovernmentH71HB71-74Constraint (mathematics)021101 geological & geomatics engineeringfiscal decentralizationlocal taxesbusiness.industry05 social sciencesPublic sectorGeneral Medicinedecentralizacja fiskalnapublic administrationDevolution0506 political scienceEconomics as a scienceObstaclesamorząd terytorialnyEconomic systembusinessComparative Economic Research. Central and Eastern Europe
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Horizontal competition in multilevel governmental settings

2013

28 pages; Governments situated on the same level of a multi-level governmental system compete with each other as well as with governments placed higher or lower. This paper is concerned with horizontal competition only. It discusses both competition based on the mobility of agents and competition based on comparisons of performance across jurisdictions - i.e., yardstick competition. With regard to the first kind, the focus is on the capacity of governments and voters to decide policies in spite of the mobility of agents. Some attention is also given to non-standard mechanisms in which mobility is manipulated so as to change the structure of the electorate. The paper considers two forms of h…

JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting BehaviordecentralizationContext (language use)DecentralizationJEL : H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • SecessionCompetition (economics)YardstickPolitical science[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and finances[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUSJEL : H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H70 - GeneralGovernmentHierarchyCompetitionPublic economicsJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • SecessionJEL: H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H70 - General[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Financeyardstick competitionMultilevel governmental settingsSpiteJEL : D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking Lobbying Elections Legislatures and Voting Behaviordecentralizationintergovernmental competitionyardstick competitionPublic financeintergovernmental competition
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