Search results for "J33"

showing 3 items of 3 documents

The public–private sector wage gap in Latvia

2018

This study investigates the public-private sector wage gap in Latvia using microdata from the labour force survey. The severity of public sector wage cuts employed as a response to the economic crisis and subsequent recovery provides a test bed to analyse whether and how the public-private sector wage gap has adjusted after consolidation-driven wage cuts. Findings reveal that the observed wage gap is slightly in favour of the public sector; however, once differences in individual characteristics and selection effects are considered, results point to a private sector wage premium. Findings also suggest that the private sector wage premium has increased since the pre-crisis period. A signific…

Labour economicsLabour force surveypublic sector wagesmedia_common.quotation_subjectJ88WageOaxaca-Ransom decompositionMicrodata (statistics)lcsh:K4430-4675lcsh:HD72-88lcsh:Economic growth development planningpublic-private sector wage gap0502 economics and businessEconomicsddc:330050207 economicsJ31lcsh:Public finance050205 econometrics media_commonpublic–private sector wage gapbusiness.industryJ3305 social sciencesPublic sectorPrivate sectorDouble sample selectionPolitical Science and International RelationsbusinessGeneral Economics Econometrics and FinanceBaltic Journal of Economics
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Les incitations à l'innovation dans le secteur privé

2011

En ligne sur http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=REL_792_0045; International audience; L'innovation est devenue un facteur clé de la croissance économique. La question des incitations à l'innovation au sein des entreprises est donc primordiale. Dans ce papier, nous nous intéressons au type d'incitations monétaires reçues par les inventeurs au sein des entreprises avec une attention particulière à la mobilité inter-entreprise de ces derniers. Les résultats montrent un rendement salarial positif pour les inventeurs, celui-ci est plus important pour les inventeurs ayant connu une mobilité inter-entreprise, ce qui pourrait suggérer que les entreprises sont prêtes à payer les connaissa…

Secteur privéCroissance économiqueIncitationR&DIncitationInnovationEntrepriseSecteur privéR&DJEL : J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J3 - Wages Compensation and Labor Costs/J.J3.J33 - Compensation Packages • Payment MethodsJEL: O - Economic Development Innovation Technological Change and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&DÉconomie de l'innovation[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJEL : O - Economic Development Innovation Technological Change and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and IncentivesJEL: J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J3 - Wages Compensation and Labor Costs/J.J3.J33 - Compensation Packages • Payment Methodsjel:O31jel:J33Entrepriseincitation inventor propensity scoreJEL : O - Economic Development Innovation Technological Change and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&DIncitation Inventeur Score de propensionjel:O32[ SHS.ECO ] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economies and financesIncitation financièreFranceJEL: O - Economic Development Innovation Technological Change and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and IncentivesInnovation[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceGeneral Economics Econometrics and Finance
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Discrimination by microcredit officers: Theory and evidence on disability in Uganda

2015

This paper studies the relationship between a microfinance institution (MFI) and its loan officers when officers discriminate against a particular group of micro-entrepreneurs. Using survey data from Uganda, we provide evidence that loan officers are more biased than other employees against disabled micro-entrepreneurs. In line with the evidence, we build an agency model of a non-profit MFI and a biased loan officer in charge of granting loans. Since incentive schemes are costly and the MFI's budget is limited, the MFI faces a trade-off between combating discrimination and granting loans. We show that the optimal incentive premium is a non-decreasing function of the MFI's budget. Moreover, …

Economics and EconometricsMinority groupmedia_common.quotation_subjectLoan officerAccountingMicrofinance; Discrimination; Credit Officers; Incentives.jel:G21law.inventionOfficerlawAgency (sociology)InstitutionEconomicsNon-conforming loanmedia_commonFinanceMicrofinancebusiness.industryCompensation (psychology)jel:J33IncentiveLoanSurvey data collectionjel:O16businessFinanceThe Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
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