Search results for "MICROECONOMICS"
showing 10 items of 442 documents
Competition and innovation with selective exit: an inverted-U shape relationship?
2017
This paper extends the approach of the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation at the industry level introduced by Aghion and coauthors. We use data of Spanish manufacturing firms from the Survey of Business Strategies (ESEE) spanning 1990–2006, as well as external information on patents from the European Patent Office and US Patent Office. Instead of an inverted-U shape, we obtain an unambiguous positive relationship between competition and patents. To explain this positive relationship, we modify their theoretical model to introduce the possibility of inefficient firms facing the threat of exit when competition intensifies. The modified model may explain both a positive…
Competition with targeted product design: Price, variety, and welfare
2018
Abstract We consider the price and welfare effects of competition in targeted product design, in the context of the Salop circle model. Changes in product design lead to demand rotations that set the stage for our analysis. With an exogenous number of firms, we show that the degree of targeted product design tends to increase with the number of firms. Moreover, under reasonable conditions, price-increasing competition takes place, for intermediate levels of the number of firms. This effect is associated with the possibility of lower consumer welfare. With endogenous firm entry, an interesting insight from our analysis is that in some situations an increase in market size or a technological …
Competitive Pressure and Innovation at the Firm Level
2015
This paper provides empirical evidence on the relationship between market competitive pressure and firms' innovation using panel data of Spanish manufacturing firms for 1990–2006. We depart from standard measures of competition, and construct variables capturing the fundamentals of competitive pressure (product substitutability, market size and entry costs) to test the theoretical predictions of Vives [2008, The Journal of Industrial Economics] for free entry. Our results line up favourably with these predictions. We obtain that greater product substitutability and higher costs of entry lead to more process innovation but less product innovation, whereas market enlargement spurs both produc…
Product-market integration with endogenous firm heterogeneity
2021
Abstract This paper proposes a general equilibrium oligopoly model in which firm heterogeneity is endogenously reproduced through technology adoption decisions. The model can explain persistent oligopolistic market structures and prices in spite of free entry and market enlargement. Moreover, strong selection might deteriorate average cost efficiency due to strategic interactions. Integrating identical countries can be welfare-improving. But distributional issues and tensions between welfare and scale economies may arise. The theory can be motivated by recent evidence on oligopolistic market structures resisting globalization forces.
Are discriminatory procurement policies motivated by protectionism ?
1995
When purchasing goods and services, governments often discriminate in favour of domestic suppliers. It is widely assumed that such behaviour is motivated by protectionism. Although this interpretation is sometimes valid, it is also puzzling. After reviewing some of the puzzles, the paper proposes an alternative explanation of preferential procurement based on the assumption that governmental buyers want to purchase goods and services at minimum cost, but must do this in a context in which, because of the presence of unverifiable services, contracts are necessarily incomplete. The paper argues that preferential purchasing can guarantee the efficient delivery of these unverifiable services.
The Strategic Use of Innovation to Influence Environmental Policy: Taxes versus Standards
2015
Abstract This paper evaluates the strategic behavior of a polluting monopolist to influence environmental policy, either with taxes or with standards, comparing two alternative policy games. The first of the games assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante level of the policy instrument. The second one is the time-consistent policy game. We find that the strategic behavior of the firm is welfare improving and leads to more environmental innovation than under regulatory commitment if a tax is used to control pollution. However, the contrary occurs if an emission standard is used. Under commitment, it is shown that both policy instruments are equivalent. We conclude that the optimal env…
Overcomplying for profit
2005
To maximize their profit, multinationals can design and implement the same and toughest standard in all locations, regardless of domestic regulations. We discuss this kind of overcompliance and stress its underpinnings. Some potential extensions are suggested.
Natural versus manufactured capital: win–lose or win–win? A case study of the Finnish pulp and paper industry
2001
Abstract The effect of investments on environmental variables has been discussed through the win–win rhetoric, specifically in micro-level analysis. On the macro-level the win–win rhetoric has been replaced by the arguments for and against the substitutability of natural and manufactured capital. Here these two concepts belonging to different levels of analysis are linked by looking at the environmental and economic effects of chosen investment strategies in a traditionally capital-intensive industry over time. The paper shows that, rather than generalise the existence of win–win situations or the substitutability of capital, these positions are determined by purely situational factors. As …
Regulation of Investments in Infrastructure: The Interplay between Strategic Behaviors and Initial Endowments
2012
This paper explores the dynamic properties of price-based policies in a model of competition between two jurisdictions. Jurisdictions invest over time in infrastructure to increase the quality of the environment, a global public good. They are identical in all respects but one: initial stocks of infrastructure. This is a dynamic type of heterogeneity that disappears in the long run. Therefore, at the steady state, usual intuitions from static settings apply: identical jurisdictions inefficiently underinvest, calling for public subsidies. In the short run, however, counterintuitive properties are established: (i) the evolution of capital stocks can be nonmonotonic and (ii) one jurisdiction c…
Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: Existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
2014
This paper focuses on oligopolistic markets in which indivisible goods are sold by multiproduct firms to a continuum of homogeneous buyers, with measure normalized to one, who have preferences over bundles of products. Our analysis contributes to the literature on private, delegated agency games with complete information, extending the insights by Chiesa and Denicolò (2009) to multiproduct markets with indivisibilities and where the agent's preferences need not be monotone. By analyzing a kind of extended contract schedules -mixed bundling prices- that discriminate on exclusivity, the paper shows that efficient equilibria always exist in such settings. There may also exist inefficient equil…