Search results for "Positivism"
showing 10 items of 125 documents
Il c.d. neocostituzionalismo e la conoscenza del diritto
2016
Da una prospettiva giusfilosofica, le tesi più interessanti del c.d. neocostituzionalismo sono quelle che sfidano il positivismo giuridico metodologico. Come approach al diritto, il positivismo giuridico presuppone la possibilità di distinguere tra il diritto qual è ed il diritto quale dovrebbe essere, tra diritto ideale e diritto reale, e, sulla base di tale distinzione, individua l’oggetto della scienza giuridica nel diritto positivo. L’attacco del neocostituzionalismo a questo modo di intendere la conoscenza del diritto ruota intorno a tre argomenti: a) l’argomento della pretesa di correttezza b) l’argomento legato alla impossibilità di distinguere nettamente l’osservatore dal partecipan…
Tak zwany konstytucjonalizm i poznaie prawa
2019
Da una prospettiva giusfilosofica, le tesi più interessanti del c.d. neocostituzionalismo sono quelle che sfidano il positivismo giuridico metodologico. Come approach al diritto, il positivismo giuridico presuppone la possibilità di distinguere tra il diritto qual è ed il diritto quale dovrebbe essere, tra diritto ideale e diritto reale, e, sulla base di tale distinzione, individua l’oggetto della scienza giuridica nel diritto positivo. L’attacco del neocostituzionalismo a questo modo di intendere la conoscenza del diritto ruota intorno a tre argomenti: a) l’argomento della pretesa di correttezza b) l’argomento legato alla impossibilità di distinguere nettamente l’osservatore dal partecipan…
Il problema della scienza giuridica
2013
POSITIVISMO JURÍDICO NORMATIVO, NEUTRALIDAD Y ESTADO DE DERECHO
2012
Usually, in jurisprudential debates what is discussed under the rubric of ‘neutrality’ is the claim that jurisprudence is (or at least can, and should be) a conceptual, or descriptive - thus, non-normative, or morally neutral - inquiry. I discuss neutrality in an altogether different sense, namely, neutrality as an ethico-political ideal the law should meet. My starting point is normative legal positivism, or the claim that it is a good and desirable thing that the laws have easily identifiable, readily accessible, as far as possible non-controversial social sources. What justifies normative legal positivism, I claim, is the value - or the ideal - of neutrality, suitably understood. I.e., w…
Il positivismo giuridico di Neil MacCormick
2009
Rule of Recognition, Convention and Obligation. What Shapiro Can Still Learn From Hart’s Mistakes
2012
Shapiro works out a version of legal positivism, taking as its starting point Hart’s practice theory of law. Some serious limits of Hart’s practice theory of norms concern the conception of legal obligation and normativity of law. In this chapter, I analyze the limits of Hart’s conception of legal normativity and I appraise whether the planning theory of law indicates the correct direction for overcoming them. To anticipate the conclusion, my effort is to show that Shapiro replicates Hart’s mistakes on these subject matters. This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, I will present briefly a critical reconstruction of Hart’s conception of normativity, a reconstruction which is…
Principles, balancing, and the separation between law and morals: on neo-constitutionalism and its critics
2011
En el ensayo Constitucionalismo principialista y constitucionalismo garantista, Luigi Ferrajoli ofrece una oportuna clarificación teórica y conceptual sobre el así llamado neoconstitucionalismo. Por mi parte, en esta contribución intentaré desarrollar algunas observaciones sobre tres puntos acerca de los cuales me encuentro en relativo desacuerdo con el análisis de Ferrajoli: el tratamiento de la distinción entre reglas y principios, la interpretación de la práctica de la ponderación, y el problema de la separación entre Derecho y moral. Además, ofreceré un panorama de los significados del (neo)constitucionalismo, y, respecto a tal panorama, consideraré el modo en el cual Ferrajoli sitúa su…
Rules, Conventionalism and Normativity: Some Remarks Starting from Hart
2014
The paper deals with the “conventionalist turn” in legal positivism in relation to the matter of the duty to obey the law and legal normativity. In this respect, conventionalist legal positivism is worth considering (a) because it offers an explanation of legal normativity partly different vis-a-vis previous ones and (b) because it tries to preserve the autonomy of legal obligation from moral obligation and coercion, respectively. Here I will only focus on legal conventionalism as sketched out by Hart in the Postscript. Indeed, Hart’s conventionalism comes up against problems which to some extent also affect other distinguished versions of legal conventionalism like, for example, those work…
The Third Theory of Legal Objectivity
2013
The question of the objectivity of law rotates around the determination of the status of the norms that constitute the major premise of the practical syllogism representing the formal scheme of the justification of judicial decisions. Those who deny the objectivity of law believe that the existence and meaning of legal norms depend on the opinion of judges and jurists considered individually. The different versions of the objectivity of law reject this sceptical conclusion. The strongest versions of objectivity accepted by the different doctrines of natural law presuppose metaphysical realism and rule out the idea that what seems correct to someone can determine what is effectively correct;…
An immense task: Hart sull'obbligo di obbedire al diritto
2012
The topic of legal normativity absorbed Hart until the last years of his life. This paper offers a diachronic analysis of Hart’s perspective on the obligation to obey the law. The aim is to show that, at least as regards the justification of the obligation to obey the law, Hart’s former attempt to maintain the autonomy of law from morality and coercion is not convincing and that the “conventionalist turn” sketched in the Postscript leads to a dead end. Therefore, to give up the autonomy of legal obligation from moral obligation seems the only way forward, being aware that this move does not imply the abjuration of legal positivism.