Search results for "Punishment"
showing 10 items of 88 documents
Child-rearing and child abuse antecedents of criminality
1999
A number of studies reviewed here show that those who are exposed to negative child-rearing practices varying from punitive and lax parenting to severe punishment and abuse in childhood tend to be antisocial, aggressive and commit violent crimes later in life. Both the record approach (Widom) studying later outcomes among abused children and the retrospective approach (Lewis) studying violent childhood experiences among offenders provide support for the violence breeds violence hypothesis. It appears clear that punishment in child-rearing increases the risk for maladaptive developmental outcomes but that the mechanism explaining the link between negative parenting and later maladjustment is…
Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict.
2011
Understanding how societies resolve conflicts between individual and common interests remains one of the most fundamental issues across disciplines. The observation that humans readily incur costs to sanction uncooperative individuals without tangible individual benefits has attracted considerable attention as a proximate cause as to why cooperative behaviours might evolve. However, the proliferation of individually costly punishment has been difficult to explain. Several studies over the last decade employing experimental designs with isolated groups have found clear evidence that the costs of punishment often nullify the benefits of increased cooperation, rendering the strong human tenden…
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: ADAM SMITH’S THEORY OF SENTIMENTAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
2020
For Adam Smith, a crime is not the result of a rational calculation of loss and gain but the consequence of envy and a vain desire to parade wealth to attract the approbation of others, combined with a natural systematic bias in overestimating the probability of success. Similarly, Smith does not conceive of legal sanctions as a rational deterrent but as deriving from the feeling of resentment. While the prevailing approach of the eighteenth century is a rational explanation of crime and a utilitarian use of punishment, Adam Smith instead builds his theory of criminal behavior and legal prosecution consistently on the sentiments. A well-functioning legal system is thus an unintended consequ…
Reviews
2004
African Film: Re‐Imagining a Continent Josef Gugler James Currey, Oxford, 2003, pb 216pp ISBN 085255561X £14 Revolution: The Explosion of World Cinema in the Sixties Peter Cowie Faber, London, 2004, hb 304pp ISBN 05712 09033 £20.00 www.faber.co.uk Sembene: Imagining Alternatives in Film and Fiction David Murphy James Currey, Oxford and Africa World Press, Trenton, 2001, pb 275 pp ISBN 0 8525 5555 5 £14.95 www.jamescurrey.co.uk Films by Michael Ondaatje (115 min); including: The Clinton Special: A Film About The Farm Show (1974, 71 min) Sons of Captain Poetry (1970, 29 min) Carry on Crime and Punishment (1970, 5 min) Available as a DVD or video from www.mongrelmedia.com Yilmaz Guney: Bir Cir…
Is it “impossible to will to be punished?” Exploring a consensual way out of the Kantian dilemma
2017
In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant wrote that “it is impossible to will to be punished”. The main goal of the present paper is to challenge this idea. In contemporary literature, a similar challenge was attempted by assigning a pivotal role to the notion of ‘consent’. Therefore, focused on these antecedents, what I will try to do in this paper is to determine whether the notion of consent is capable of playing any role whatsoever in a justificatory theory of punishment.
Principi di diritto penale: parte generale. Nona edizione riveduta e aggiornata
2020
Nona edizione della Parte generale dei Principi di diritto penale, di Antonio Pagliaro, riveduta e aggiornata da Vincenzo Militello, Manfredi Parodi Giusino e Alessandro Spena Ninth edition of Antonio Pagliaro' Principles of criminal law, General part, revised and updated by Vincenzo Militello, Manfredi Parodi Giusino e Alessandro Spena
Damned If You Do and Damned If You Don’t: Two Masters
2018
Available online: 05 June 2018 We study common agency problems in which two principals (groups) make costly commitments to incentives that are conditioned on imperfect signals of the agent's action. Our framework allows for incentives to be either rewards or punishments. For our basic model we obtain a unique equilibrium, which typically involves randomization by both principals. Greater similarity between principals leads to more aggressive competition. The principals weakly prefer punishment to rewards, sometimes strictly. With rewards an agent voluntarily joins both groups with punishment it depends on whether severe punishments are feasible and cheap for the principals. We study whether…
Coordinated Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation
2015
In this paper, we analyze a team trust game with coordinated Q1 punishment of the allocator by investors and where there is also a final stage of peer punishment. We study the effect of punishment on the reward and the investment decisions, when the effectiveness and cost of coordinated punishment depend on the number of investors adhering to this activity. The interaction takes place in an overlapping-generations model with heterogeneous preferences and incomplete information. The only long-run outcomes of the dynamics are either a fully cooperative culture (FCC) with high levels of trust and cooperation and fair returns or a non-cooperative culture with no cooperation at all. The basin of…
Blind justice: An experimental analysis of random punishment in team production
2010
We study the effect of blind punishment in a team production experiment, in which subjects choose non-observable effort levels. In this setting, a random exclusion mechanism is introduced, linked to the normalized group performance (R, from 0 to 1). Every round, each subject is non-excluded from the collective profit with probability R (and with probability 1 ! R gets no benefit from the group account). Punishment does not depend on the individual behavior, but the probability of being punished reflects collective performance. As the exclusion probability is computed at the group level, no individual information is needed to implement exclusion. However, the probabilistic punishment risks t…
Cooperation and Status in Organizations
2010
We report the results of experiments designed to test the effect of social status on contributions to a public good, with and without punishment. The experiments are conducted in four-person groups in a “star” network, where one central player observes and is observed by the others. This imposes a social structure on the game, and gives the central player a leadership role in the group, simply by virtue of being commonly observed. We further manipulate status by allocating the central position to the person who earns the highest, or the lowest, score on a trivia quiz. These high-status and low-status treatments are compared, and we find that the effect of organizational structure—the existe…