Search results for "Realism"
showing 10 items of 298 documents
Relativism and Realism in the Philosophy of Science
2020
The philosophy of science is an important field of philosophy, where relativism and realism meet. The philosophy of science studies the nature of scientific knowledge, general justifications and scientific activity. Many of the things I have discussed in the previous chapters are also relevant for the philosophy of science. Scientific realism has been one of the most significant movements in the philosophy of science. However, its problems have paved the way for perspectivism, according to which perspectives (points of view) are a part of all scientific activity, from observations to theoretical assumptions. I will show that scientific realism could not be defended using a Tarskian semantic…
Theodor Celms and the “Realism–Idealism” Controversy
2020
It was in his research manuscripts from 1905, also known as the Seefelder Blatter, where Edmund Husserl for the first time introduced the idea of the phenomenological reduction. The introduction of this idea, which he developed and refined years to come, marked the beginning not only of an important turn in Husserl’s philosophy toward transcendental phenomenology, but also the advent of a growing frustration and critique even among Husserl’s own students. The discussion about the ontological status of reality is otherwise known as the realism–idealism controversy. One of the first critiques in a published form came from the Latvian philosopher and Husserl’s student in Freiburg, Theodor Celm…
Classical and Connectionist Models: Levels of Description
1993
To begin, I introduce an analysis of interlevel relations that allows us to offer an initial characterization of the debate about the way classical and connectionist models relate. Subsequently, I examine a compatibility thesis and a conditional claim on this issue. With respect to the compatibility thesis, I argue that, even if classical and connectionist models are not necessarily incompatible, the emergence of the latter seems to undermine the best arguments for the Language of Thought Hypothesis, which is essential to the former. I attack the conditional claim of connectionism to eliminativism, presented by Ramsey et al. (1990), by discrediting their discrete characterization of common-…
Realism, metamathematics, and the unpublished essays
1995
This initial chapter is divided into two sections. The first is devoted to a brief exposition of the intuitive essence and the philosophical motivation of Godel’s main metamathematical results, namely his completeness theorem for elementary logic (1930) and his incompleteness theorems for arithmetic (1931). Thereafter some discussion of the different ways to confront the relationship between those results and Godel’s philosophical realism in logic and mathematics is offered. Thus, mathematical realism will be successively regarded as (i) a philosophical consequence of those results; (ii) a heuristic principle which leads to them; (iii) a philosophical hypothesis which is “verified” by them.…
Normativity all the way down: from normative realism to pannormism
2017
In this paper, I will give an argument for what I call pannormism, the view according to which if x instantiates a metaphysically basic normative property F, then whatever grounds the being of x also instantiates F. In slogan form: if there is normativity, there is normativity all the way down. Such pannormism is in many ways analogous to panpsychism, and my discussion also contains an important lesson for panpsychism, a way to avoid its so-called combination problem. In Sect. 1, I present the argument; in Sect. 2, I discuss its conclusion.
From Carneades to Cicero
2015
This chapter is about how Stoic epistemology developed in the two centuries after Chrysippus’ death. I first show that, as a result of Carneades’ critique in the mid-second century, there was a shift of emphasis in the epistemological debate between the Stoa and the Academy. From then on the task was not to explain what causal features a cognitive thought has, but to describe what phenomenological features it has. I show that the later Stoics responded to this challenge in two different ways. Some changed Chrysippus’ theory quite radically. They held that a cognitive thought is characterized by giving rise to a sense of conviction, denied that preconceptions count as cognitive thoughts, and…
Peirce-Suit of Truth – Why Inference to the Best Explanation and Abduction Ought Not to be Confused
2004
It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is drivenby three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What isbehind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identificationof “abduction” with “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE) begs the question,since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction.Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, however, is to show that this distinction is most relevant with respect to current problems in philosophy of science and epistemology (like attempts to supply s…
Interpersonal Recognition and Responsiveness to Relevant Differences
2006
Abstract This essay defends a three‐dimensional response‐model theory of recognition of persons, and discusses the related phenomenon of recognition of reasons, values and principles. The theory is three‐dimensional in endorsing recognition of the equality of persons and two kinds of relevant differences: merits and special relationships. It defends a ‘response‐model’ which holds that adequacy of recognition of persons is a matter of adequate responsiveness to situation‐specific reasons and requirements. This three‐dimensional response‐model is compared to Peter Jones’s view, which draws the distinction between status and merit recognition, and mediated and unmediated recognition. The essay…
En respuesta al comentario de Carlos Pereda sobre Un lugar para la moral
2004
Carlos Pereda califica mi concepción de la moral de realismo particularista y objeta a mi defensa tanto del realismo como del particularismo. En mi respuesta trato de mostrar cómo nuestras discrepancias en torno al papel de los principios en la deliberación moral es, excepto en un punto crucial, cuestión de énfasis. No ocurre lo mismo, sin embargo, con mi reivindicación del realismo moral, pues parte de lo que intento mostrar en el libro es que los programas constructivistas de los que habla Pereda no pueden pensarse coherentemente.
From Fantasy to Magic Realism
1998
Much use has been made of the term ‘magic realism’ to refer to texts which introduce an important ‘imaginary’ dimension into ‘realistic’ evocations of the world. The Cuban Alejo Carpentier has also coined the phrase to real maravilloso (marvellous reality) which he applies to a vision characteristic of Central and South America.