Search results for "Reason"
showing 10 items of 526 documents
Ancient Theories of Reasoning
2013
In this section, the central question is whether we can find ancient discussions concerning what happens in the mind when a conclusion is drawn. Did ancient authors suppose that there is a psychological force that compels us to accept the conclusion when the premises are accepted and the inference is valid? Or, if the inference is not deductively valid but adds to the credibility of the conclusion in another way, e.g., by being inductive, what happens in the mind when such an inference is drawn? In general, psychology of reasoning was not a vital topic in antiquity. Reasoning was typically considered from a logical, not from a psychological point of view. For example, in Stoic sources the n…
Functional fixedness and functional reduction as common sense reasonings in chemical equilibrium and in geometry and polarity of molecules
2000
Many of the learning difficulties in the specific domain of chemistry are found not only in the ideas already possessed by students but in the strategic and procedural knowledge that is characteristic of everyday thinking. These defects in procedural knowledge have been described as functional fixedness and functional reduction. This article assesses the procedural difficulties of students (grade 12 and first and third year of university) based on common sense reasoning in two areas of chemistry: chemical equilibrium and geometry and polarity of molecules. In the first area, the theme of external factors affecting equilibria (temperature and concentration change) was selected because the ex…
The Role of Ciphering in Phenomenology of Life
2004
Contemporary philosophy is inseparable from the general tendencies of spiritual life that have dominated over the past centuries. The ruling tendency of European-type philosophy has been the affirmation of a democratic life style, liberal values and human individuality and creative activity. The testimony to this is the proportional growth of the philosophy of subjectivism since modern times, the division of pure practical reason and reasoning into separate spheres to substantiate fundamental human abilities, to analyse the ways of grasping the world — such as cognition, understanding, intuition, deciphering, experience — and describe man’s correlation with beingness (cosmos). Epistemology …
?What ought we do?? and other questions
2020
Kant formulates the question “What ought I do?” as an agent’s question. This is not the only way in which practical reasoning can be approached. A great deal of contemporary work in ethics and political philosophy addresses different, often narrower, questions. Much of it focuses primarily on recipients rather than agents, and so on entitlements or rights rather than on requirements or duties to act, including most obviously discussions of human rights. I will consider some of the consequences and the advantages of starting from each of these questions, and some of the ways in which each shapes practical reasoning.
The Epistemological Interpretation of Transcendental Idealism and Its Unavoidable Slide into Compatibilism
2019
This paper consists in two major parts. In the first part, I explain and defend Kant’s explicit rejection of compatibilist theories of freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. I do this by a careful analysis of some contemporary compatibilist theories. In the second major part, I explain how the epistemological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism inevitably degenerates into a compatibilist version of freedom. The upshot will be that epistemological interpretations of transcendental idealism are not viable because of their connection with compatibilism, which Kant rejected.
Hans Kelsen and Practical Reason
2017
The critique of practical reason, in all its possible forms, has a far more important and decisive role in Kelsen’s thought than the rejection of Natural law doctrine. Admitting that a practical use of reason is legitimate, namely, that there is a possible connection between intellect and will, would mean destroying the whole foundation of the scientific undertaking of the Pure Theory of law and its conception of the legal norm, which is its central aspect. By depriving practical reason of all foundation, any reference to agency and practical deliberation is excluded from Kelsen’s theory of law. Consequently, the Ought loses all capacity of attraction and motivation of human action, renderi…
Is the Categorical Imperative the Highest Principle of Both Pure Practical and Theoretical Reason?
2014
AbstractIn her new book, Patricia Kitcher supports Onora O'Neill's view that the categorical imperative is the highest principle of both practical and theoretical reason. I claim that neither O'Neill's original interpretation nor Kitcher's additional evidence in favour of it are convincing. At its core, this misconception of Kant's position consists in the identification of self-referential critique of reason with the concept of autonomy. It will be shown that the ‘common principle’ (Kant) of both practical and theoretical reason is not the categorical imperative, but the reflective power of judgement, as Kant claims in the Critique of the Power of Judgement.
Choice and Practical Reasoning in Ancient Philosophy
2013
Ancient thinkers acknowledged that we are the sort of creatures that want things to be a certain way and can make efforts for them to become that way. In that sense, the ancients had a notion of volition. But it is not clear how they conceived of volition. The problem is partly historical. Some late ancient, notably Christian thinkers came to regard volition in a different way than earlier thinkers had done, seeing reason as a less powerful ability than Socrates did, and instead placing their hopes on the will, which they regarded as a separate and sovereign part of the soul. About these historical developments there is much debate and little agreement. The problem is also partly conceptual…
Tre osservazioni su diez tesis acerca de la coherencia en el Derecho
2021
El artículo está dedicado a tres observaciones críticas sobre la concepción de la coherencia defendida por Amaya. Estas observaciones se refieren a: a) la supuesta incompatibilidad entre la coherencia y la concepción instrumental de la razón práctica; b) la aspiración a la best explanation y, finalmente, c) al vínculo entre la coherencia y la responsabilidad epistémica.
Our Progress Towards Virtue
2015
This chapter is about how we can improve our rational abilities, i.e. make progress towards virtue. I first show that, according to Chrysippus, the natural properties of children are usually corrupted in three ways when they grow up and that adults therefore can make progress only by solving their inner conflicts, becoming more steadfast in their practical reasoning, and improving their self-understanding. So I argue that the main remedy against corruption is to study philosophy. I detail how we can acquire a better self-understanding by studying physics and how we can cure the mind of its inconsistencies by studying logic. I also argue that ethics prepares the mind for an active life in wh…