Search results for "Self-conscious"

Self-consciousness Scale: a study of Spanish housewives.

1990

The purpose of this study was to examine the applicability with 93 Spanish housewives of the translated Self-consciousness Scale. We present reliability measures and normative data, and we also include data for two clinical samples (31 depressive and 31 asthmatic women patients).

Karl Marx: dalla filosofia dell'autocoscienza alla filosofia della prassi

2018

The interpretation of the philosophical thought of Karl Marx given in the second half of the twentieth century canonically distinguishes between the works of the youth period and those of the maturity. Even if only a few interpreters have supported the thesis of the existence of “two Marx”, one opposed to the other, the attention given to some posthumous writings (the Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Public Law and the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 in particular) inevitably led to neglect the writings of the younger Marx. However, the years spent in Berlin (1836-41) are decisive, both for the experience gained alongside the young Hegelians and for the discovery of philo…

Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference

2003

A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of “phenomenal opacity” and “phenomenal transparency” are interesting instruments for analyzing conscious, self-represen…

Transcendental Apperception: Consciousness or Self-Consciousness? Comments on Chapter 9 of Patricia Kitcher'sKant's Thinker

2014

AbstractA core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations ‘as such’ and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or ‘self-made-ness’ of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations ‘as such’ should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to lack the theoretical resources to clearly distinguish between (first-level) consciousness and self-consciousness or apperception properly so-called.

Karl Marx: Umanismo e Materialismo

2022

In the context of the contemporary age, Karl Marx represents a classical author. His theory of historical materialism is the basis of his general vision of reality with the principles of “self-consciousness” and “class consciousness”. To the optimism of idealism, centered on pure theory, Marx opposes a new cultural model in relation to praxis and political economy. His production must therefore be read in all its phases, from youth to maturity, with the aim of interpreting historical materialism as a peculiar form of humanism and naturalism. Humanism; Naturalism; Self-consciousness; Class Consciousness.

Unconscious integration of multisensory bodily inputs in the peripersonal space shapes bodily self-consciousness

2017

International audience; Recent studies have highlighted the role of multisensory integration as a key mechanism of self-consciousness. In particular, integration of bodily signals within the peripersonal space (PPS) underlies the experience of the self in a body we own (self-identification) and that is experienced as occupying a specific location in space (self-location), two main components of bodily self-consciousness (BSC). Experiments investigating the effects of multisensory integration on BSC have typically employed supra-threshold sensory stimuli, neglecting the role of unconscious sensory signals in BSC, as tested in other consciousness research. Here, we used psychophysical techniq…

Imatges del món i miralls literaris. L'escriptura metaficcional en l'obra de Carme Riera

2021

L'article proposa una anàlisi, com a eix vertebrador de la literatura de Carme Riera, dels elements que, a l'interior de la diègesi, giren l'atenció cap a la mateixa condició literària del text i cap als mecanismes de construcció i de funcionament que li són propis; és a dir, d'aquells elements que posen de manifest el caràcter ficcional de l’obra i mitjançant els quals s'hi planteja un pacte metaficcional. L'autoconsciència i l'autoreferencialitat del text metaficcional trenquen amb la il·lusió mimètica pròpia del pacte realista per a plantejar una reflexió sobre l'artifici dels sistemes de captació del real per part de la literatura, deixant al descobert els límits i els codis que regeixe…

Radical disruptions of self-consciousness

2020

This special issue is about something most of us might find very hard to conceive: states of consciousness in which self-consciousness is radically disrupted or altogether missing.

2013

This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of "minimal phenomenal selfhood," which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to bring it into existence. This contribution argues that research on bodiless dreams, asomatic out-of-body experiences, and ful…

2013

This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analysed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition, such as mental agency, explicit, consciously experienced goal-directedness, or availability for veto control. I claim that for roughly two thirds of our life-time we do not possess mental autonomy (M-autonomy) in this sense…