Search results for "Sequential game"
showing 9 items of 19 documents
The video game experience as 'true' identification: A theory of enjoyable alterations of players' self-perception
2009
This article introduces an explication of video game players' identification with a game character or role that is based on social-psychological models of self-perception. Contrasting with conventional ("dyadic" ) notions of media user-character relationships (e.g., parasocial interaction or affective disposition theory), ("monadic" ) video game identification is defined as a temporal shift of players' self-perception through adoption of valued properties of the game character. Implications for media enjoyment, the measurement of identification, and media effects are discussed. © 2009 International Communication Association.
Dynamic Coalitional TU Games: Distributed Bargaining among Players' Neighbors
2013
We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time, the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic, stochastic or interval valued TU games as it combines dynamics of the game with an allocation protocol for the players that dynamically interact with each other. The protocol is an iterative and decentralized algorithm that offers a paradigmatic mathematical description of negotiation and bargaining processes. The first part of the paper contributes to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development of a distributed bargaining protoc…
Robust dynamic cooperative games
2009
Classical cooperative game theory is no longer a suitable tool for those situations where the values of coalitions are not known with certainty. Recent works address situations where the values of coalitions are modelled by random variables. In this work we still consider the values of coalitions as uncertain, but model them as unknown but bounded disturbances. We do not focus on solving a specific game, but rather consider a family of games described by a polyhedron: each point in the polyhedron is a vector of coalitions’ values and corresponds to a specific game. We consider a dynamic context where while we know with certainty the average value of each coalition on the long run, at each t…
Achieving Unbounded Resolution inFinitePlayer Goore Games Using Stochastic Automata, and Its Applications
2012
Abstract This article concerns the sequential solution to a distributed stochastic optimization problem using learning automata and the Goore game (also referred to as the Gur game in the related literature). The amazing thing about our solution is that, unlike traditional methods, which need N automata (where N determines the degree of accuracy), in this article, we show that we can obtain arbitrary accuracy by recursively using only three automata. To be more specific, the Goore game (GG) introduced in Tsetlin (1973) has the fascinating property that it can be resolved in a completely distributed manner with no inter-communication between the players. The game has recently found applicati…
Consensus in Noncooperative Dynamic Games: a Multi-Retailer Inventory Application
2008
We focus on Nash equilibria and Pareto optimal Nash equilibria for a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game with a special structure of the stage cost. We study the existence of these solutions by proving that the game is a potential game. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize the aforementioned solutions and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multistage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately, not necessarily Pareto op…
Noncooperative dynamic games for inventory applications: A consensus approach
2008
We focus on a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game where the stage cost of a single player associated to a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players making the same decision. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize Nash equilibria and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multi-stage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns a seque…
Mean Field Linear Quadratic Games with Set Up Costs
2013
This paper studies linear quadratic games with set up costs monotonic on the number of active players, namely, players whose action is non-null. Such games arise naturally in joint replenishment inventory systems. Building upon a preliminary analysis of the properties of the best response strategies and Nash equilibria for the given game, the main contribution is the study of the same game under large population. We also analyze the influence of an additional disturbance in the spirit of the literature on H∞ control. Numerical illustrations are provided. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Large Networks of Dynamic Agents: Consensus under Adversarial Disturbances
2012
This paper studies interactions among homogeneous social groups within the framework of large population games. Each group is represented by a network and the behavior described by a two-player repeated game. The contribution is three-fold. Beyond the idea of providing a novel two-level model with repeated games at a lower level and population games at a higher level, we also establish a mean field equilibrium and study state feedback best-response strategies as well as worst-case adversarial disturbances in that context.
Service Provisioning with Multiple Service Providers in 5G Ultra-dense Small Cell Networks
2015
In this work, a game theoretical approach for addressing the virtual network service providers (NSPs), small cell provider (SCP) and user interaction in heterogenous small cell networks is presented. In particular, we consider the users can select the services of different NSPs based on their prices. The NSPs have no dedicated hardware and need to rent from the SCP in term of radio resources, e.g., small cell base stations (SBSs) in order to provide satisfied services to the users. Due to the fact that the selfish parties involved aim at maximizing their own profits, a hierarchical dynamic game framework is presented to address interactive decision problem. In the lower-level, a Stackelberg…