Search results for "games"

Revista electrónica de investigación y evaluación educativa

2014

La Economía Experimental ha desarrollado diferentes experimentos que pueden ser aprovechados como una actividad docente en la enseñanza de la Economía. Su naturaleza activa y participativa motiva a los alumnos y estimula la reflexión y la mejor comprensión de algunos fenómenos económicos como el funcionamiento de los mercados, donde los resultados individuales dependen del conjunto de las decisiones de los agentes y de sus interacciones. Los experimentos económicos tienen ya una larga tradición, y han proporcionado resultados espectaculares y conclusiones ampliamente admitidas sobre la dinámica de mercados y el efecto de las instituciones económicas. Las nuevas tecnologías facilitan la real…

Biopharmaceutical alliances and competition: a real options game approach

2013

The eSports conundrum: is the sports sciences community ready to face them? A perspective

2020

The reality of eSports is something much more complex than individual users playing video games. There are several characteristics that eSports have in common with traditional sports: from the spirit of competition to the structural composition of the teams, including the increase in performance with training and practice, up to the injuries and physical and psychological stress of the athlete. The number of scientific papers interested in this reality is still relatively low, although in recent years there has been a significant increase in this regard. Probably the lack of knowledge of the world of eSports by inexperts can represent an initial obstacle in the approach to this environment.…

Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict.

2011

Understanding how societies resolve conflicts between individual and common interests remains one of the most fundamental issues across disciplines. The observation that humans readily incur costs to sanction uncooperative individuals without tangible individual benefits has attracted considerable attention as a proximate cause as to why cooperative behaviours might evolve. However, the proliferation of individually costly punishment has been difficult to explain. Several studies over the last decade employing experimental designs with isolated groups have found clear evidence that the costs of punishment often nullify the benefits of increased cooperation, rendering the strong human tenden…

Codification schemes and finite automata

2000

This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design both of communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by boundedly rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both theories to improve the existing automata bounds of Neyman¿s (1998) work on finitely repeated games played by finite automata.

Serious Games for Health and Safety Training

2011

EUROSTAT figures show that 5720 people die in the European Union every year as a consequence of work-related accidents. Training in Health and Safety is indeed a key aspect to reduce this figure, and serious games constitute an effective method to provide this training. However, the development of this type of computer applications is a complex issue, requiring cross discipline knowledge on different areas, including instructional design, psychology, sociology, law, and computer graphics. Beyond the challenges already present in the development of non-educational computer games, serious games for health and safety are instructional tools. Therefore, they require an instructional design to c…

A saturated strategy robustly ensures stability of the cooperative equilibrium for Prisoner's dilemma

2016

We study diffusion of cooperation in a two-population game in continuous time. At each instant, the game involves two random individuals, one from each population. The game has the structure of a Prisoner's dilemma where each player can choose either to cooperate (c) or to defect (d), and is reframed within the field of approachability in two-player repeated game with vector payoffs. We turn the game into a dynamical system, which is positive, and propose a saturated strategy that ensures local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium (c, c) for any possible choice of the payoff matrix. We show that there exists a rectangle, in the space of payoffs, which is positively invariant for the syst…

Crowd-Averse Cyber-Physical Systems: The Paradigm of Robust Mean-Field Games

2016

For a networked controlled system, we illustrate the paradigm of robust mean-field games. This is a modeling framework at the interface of differential game theory, mathematical physics, and $H_{\infty}$ - optimal control that tries to capture the mutual influence between a crowd and its individuals. First, we establish a mean-field system for such games including the effects of adversarial disturbances. Second, we identify the optimal response of the individuals for a given population behavior. Third, we provide an analysis of equilibria and their stability.

On the Coincidence of the Feedback Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria in Economic Applications of Differential Games

2002

In this paper the scope of the applicability of the Stackelberg equilibrium concept in differential games is investigated. Firstly, conditions for obtaining the coincidence between the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria are defined in terms of the instantaneous pay-off function and the state equation of the game. Secondly, it is showed that for a class of differential games with state-interdependence both equilibria are identical independently of the player being the leader of the game. A survey of different economic models shows that this coincidence is going to occur for a good number of economic applications of differential games. This result appears because of the continuous-time setting i…

Collusion Constrained Equilibrium

2018

First published: 01 February 2018 This is an open access article licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License 4.0 (http://econtheory.org) We study collusion within groups in noncooperative games. The primitives are the preferences of the players, their assignment to nonoverlapping groups, and the goals of the groups. Our notion of collusion is that a group coordinates the play of its members among different incentive compatible plans to best achieve its goals. Unfortunately, equilibria that meet this requirement need not exist. We instead introduce the weaker notion of collusion constrained equilibrium. This allows groups to put positive probability on alternatives …