Search results for "jel:D8"

showing 10 items of 23 documents

Testing For Asymmetric Information In Insurance Markets With Unobservable Types

2008

In two important recent papers, Finkelstein and McGarry [25] and Finkelstein and Poterba [28] propose a new test for asymmetric information in insurance markets that considers explicitly unobserved heterogeneity in insurance demand. In this paper we propose an alternative implementation of the Finkelstein-McGarry-Poterba test based on the identification of unobservable types by use of finite mixture models. The actual implementation of our test follows some recent advances on marginal modelling as applied to latent class analysis; formal testing procedures for the null of asymmetric information and for the hypothesis that private information is indeed multidimensional can be performed by im…

Asymmetric Information Unobservable Types Latent Class Analysis Long Term Insurance Market.jel:D82jel:I11Asymmetric Information Unobservable Types Latent Class Analysis Long Term Insurance Marketjel:G22
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Pragmatic languages with universal grammars

2012

Abstract This paper constructs the equilibrium for a specific code that can be seen as a “universal grammar” in a class of common interest Sender–Receiver games where players communicate through a noisy channel. We propose a Senderʼs signaling strategy which does not depend on either the game payoffs or the initial probability distribution. The Receiverʼs strategy partitions the set of possible sequences into subsets, with a single action assignment to each of them. The Senderʼs signaling strategy is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. when the Receiver responds best to the Senderʼs strategy, the Sender has no incentive to deviate. An example shows that a tie-breaking decoding is crucial for the block…

Computer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryEconomics and EconometricsTheoretical computer sciencejel:C61jel:D82Symmetric gamejel:C73TheoryofComputation_GENERALgrammar pragmatic language prototypes separating equilibriasymbols.namesakeNash equilibriumsymbolsCode (cryptography)Probability distributionCommunication sourceSignaling gameSet (psychology)FinanceDecoding methodsComputer Science::Information TheoryMathematicsGames and Economic Behavior
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THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN ROMANIA’S PARTICIPATION IN DIGITAL ECONOMY

2012

To participate in the digital economy, for a nation, it is imperative the need to adopt ICT, but not only at companies and individuals levels but also on the entire society. The national ICT adoption is significant especially in sustainable economic development of Romania. The degree to which Romania join the digital economy is influenced by measures and policies adopted by the government. The Government should facilitate, motivate and support the adoption of ICT at all three levels: individual, entrepreneurial and governmental. A nation cannot benefit from participation in digital economy when the government vision on the use of modern technology is not sufficiently developed. If Romania w…

ComputingMilieux_GENERALjel:M10jel:M21jel:D83jel:O16digital economy government e-readiness ICTRevista Economica
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Knowledge management – a source of sustainable competitiveness in the knowledge based economy

2006

Confirming the well known thesis knowledge is power, A. Toffler argued that the knowledge based society represents the acme of the human society development and P. Drucker said that the developed countries passing through the knowledge based society represents the biggest change of the modern world. That made possible and helped the emerging of the managerial revolution (defined as knowledge applied to knowledge itself) at the firm’s level. Under these circumstances, knowledge has to be seen as a strategic resource – source of competitive advantages and of managerial performances as well. Considering this, a firm’s management have to define a coherent behavioral model in order to seriously …

ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSIONknowledge based society; competitiveness; knowledge management; managerial revolutionjel:D83jel:M19jel:L29
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Unawareness and bankruptcy: A general equilibrium model

1998

International audience; We present a consistent pure-exchange general equilibrium model where agents may not be able to foresee all possible future contingencies. In this context, even with nominal assets and complete asset markets, an equilibrium may not exist without appropriate assumptions. Specific examples are provided. An existence result is proved under the main assumption that there are sufficiently many states that all the agents foresee. An intrinsic feature of the model is bankruptcy, which agents may involuntarily experience in the unforeseen states.

Economics and Econometricsjel:D81General equilibrium theoryjel:D84jel:D5205 social sciencesUnawarenessContext (language use)JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty/D.D8.D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty16. Peace & justice[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and FinanceJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty/D.D8.D84 - Expectations • SpeculationsMicroeconomicsbankruptcyBankruptcyJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D52 - Incomplete Markets0502 economics and businessEconomics050206 economic theoryAsset (economics)jel:D4050207 economicsMathematical economicsPublic financeJEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure Pricing and Design
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Nash codes for noisy channels

2012

This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel. The sender's strategy, called a code, maps states of nature to signals. The receiver's best response is to decode the received channel output as the state with highest expected receiver payoff. Given this decoding, an equilibrium or "Nash code" results if the sender encodes every state as prescribed. We show two theorems that give sufficient conditions for Nash codes. First, a receiver-optimal code defines a Nash code. A second, more surprising observati…

FOS: Computer and information sciencesComputer Science::Computer Science and Game TheoryTheoretical computer scienceComputer scienceInformation Theory (cs.IT)Computer Science - Information TheoryStochastic gamejel:C72jel:D82Stability (learning theory)Data_CODINGANDINFORMATIONTHEORYManagement Science and Operations Researchsender-receiver game communication noisy channel91A28Computer Science ApplicationsComputer Science - Computer Science and Game TheoryBest responseCode (cryptography)Coordination gameQA MathematicsDecoding methodsCommunication channelComputer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)Computer Science::Information Theory
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A Naïve Sticky Information Model of Households’ Inflation Expectations

2009

This paper provides a simple epidemiology model where households, when forming their inflation expectations, rationally adopt the past release of inflation with certain probability rather than the forward-looking newspaper forecast as suggested in Carroll [2003, Macroeconomic Expectations of Households and Professional Forecasters, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 269-298]. The posterior model probabilities based on the Michigan survey data strongly support the proposed model. We also extend the agent-based epidemiology model by deriving for it a simple adaptation, which is suitable for estimation. Our results show that this model is able to capture the heterogeneity in households’ expe…

InflationEstimationEconomics and Econometricsjel:C82Control and OptimizationInflation expectations; heterogeneous expectations; survey expectations; sticky information; Bayesian analysisjel:D84Applied Mathematicsmedia_common.quotation_subjectjel:C5305 social sciencesBayesian probabilityjel:E31jel:C11DeflationSticky information0502 economics and businessEconometricsEconomicsSurvey data collection050207 economicsSimulation methods050205 econometrics media_common
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El componente de selección adversa de la horquilla de precios cotizada: una revisión de los modelos de estimación

2005

-Jose.E.Farinos@uv.es -Ana.M.Ibanez@uv.es Una de las principales preocupaciones en el área de la microestructura del mercado ha sido la estimación de los componentes no observables de la horquilla de precios a partir de las series de datos que proporcionan los mercados financieros, despertando quizá un mayor interés el de selección adversa por la implicaciones que supone la existencia del mismo. Esto ha provocado el desarrollo de numerosos modelos empíricos que, basándose en las propiedades estadísticas de las series de precios, proporcionan dichas estimaciones. La mayor disponibilidad de datos existentes en los mercados ha permitido el desarrollo en los últimos años de modelos basados en t…

Microestructura de los mercados financieros; Negociación informada; Horquilla de precios; Selección adversa; Costes de transacciónmarket microstructureselección adversajel:D82spreadinsider tradingFINANCIAL ECONOMICSadverse selection componentG12G34microestructura de los mercados financieros:CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Economía sectorial::Finanzas y seguros [UNESCO]ECONOMICSORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENTBUSINESS AND INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENTUNESCO::CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS::Economía sectorial::Finanzas y segurosjel:G12jel:G34Costes de transacciónD82MICROECONOMICSmicroestructura de los mercados financieros negociación informada horquilla de precios selección adversa market microstructure insider trading spread adverse selection component transaction costtransaction costhorquilla de preciosINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND LABORSTRATEGY AND MANAGEMENTnegociación informada
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How individual characteristics shape the structure of social networks

2015

Abstract We study how students’ social networks emerge by documenting systematic patterns in the process of friendship formation of incoming students; these students all start out in a new environment and thus jointly create a new social network. As a specific novelty, we consider cooperativeness, time and risk preferences – elicited experimentally – together with factors like socioeconomic and personality characteristics. We find a number of robust predictors of link formation and of the position within the social network (local and global network centrality). In particular, cooperativeness has a complex association with link formation. We also find evidence for homophily along several dim…

Organizational Behavior and Human Resource ManagementEconomics and Econometricsjel:C93Social networkbusiness.industrymedia_common.quotation_subjectjel:D85CooperativenessNoveltyHomophilyjel:I25jel:J24FriendshipSocial networks education link formation homophily cooperation field and lab dataGlobal networkPersonalityPsychologybusinessCentralitySocial psychologymedia_common
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Conflict and segregation in networks: An experiment on the interplay between individual preferences and social influence

2016

We examine the interplay between a person's individual preference and the social influence others exert. We provide a model of network relationships with conflicting preferences, where individuals are better off coordinating with those around them, but where not all have a preference for the same action. We test our model in an experiment, varying the level of conflicting preferences between individuals. Our findings suggest that preferences are more salient than social influence, under conflicting preferences: subjects relate mainly with others who have the same preferences. This leads to two undesirable outcomes: network segregation and social inefficiency. The same force that helps peopl…

Statistics and Probability0209 industrial biotechnology021103 operations researchApplied Mathematicsjel:D85jel:C72jel:D820211 other engineering and technologiesjel:C6202 engineering and technologyEconomiaHeterogeneity Social Networks Formation Equilibrium selectionPreferenceTest (assessment)020901 industrial engineering & automationAction (philosophy)SalientEquilibrium selectionModeling and SimulationEconomicsInefficiencySocial psychologySocial influenceJournal of Dynamics and Games
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